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Abstract
The goal of the current work is to introduce ourselves in the world of steganogra-
phy and steganalysis, centering our efforts in acoustic signals, a branch of steganog-
raphy and steganalysis which has received much less attention than steganography
and steganalysis for images. With this purpose in mind, it’s essential to get first
a basic level of understanding of signal theory and the properties of the Human
Auditory System, and we will dedicate ourselves to that aim during the first part
of this work. Once established those basis, in the second part, we will obtain a
precise image of the state of the art in steganographic and steganalytic sciences,
from which we will be able to establish or deduce some good practices guides.
With both previous subjects in mind, we will be able to create, design and imple-
ment a stego-system over Vorbis audio codec and, finally, as conclusion, analyze
it using the principles studied during the first and second parts.
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Preface
Nowadays, the word steganography may not tell us by itself much about its mean-
ing, but its etymological origins does not left much place to doubts. From an-
cient Greek, the word steganography was composed by στεγανo´ζ , pronounced
steganos, meaning covert, and γραφ − ειν, pronounced grafein, meaning writ-
ing, taking the union of both the sense of covert writing, i.e., the art of writing a
message and sending it without a third person different than the intended recipient
being able to even know that he has the message in his hands. Steganography dif-
fers from cryptography in that its main purpose is to protect the transmitted infor-
mation by hiding it, instead of making it intelligible. Historically, steganography,
as cryptography, dates back from ancient times. For example, at the 5th century
B.C., the Greek historian Herodotus told how Histiaeus, motivated by instigating
a revolution against the Persians, shaved the head of his most loyal slave, tattooed
a message on it, and let the hair grow up again before sending him to transmit
the message, being the very existence of the message hidden in that way. When
the slave was received by Aristagoras of Miletus, he shaved once again the slave’s
head and was able to read the message that his nephew sent to him. Another
method used in ancient China consisted of writing a message in thin cloth which
was coverd aftewards with wax forming a ball; the messenger ate the wax ball,
carrying the message inside himself. Also, the typical kids game of writing with
lemon juice in a paper and reading against the light the so hidden message. All
this are steganography examples.
The first theoretic formalization of stegaongraphy came from Gustavus J. Sim-
mons in [36]. In his article, Simmons analyzes how two prisoners, being held in
different cells, but who are permitted to communicate through supervised mes-
sages, can communicate without arousing suspicion. The two prisoners, Alice
and Bob, sent messages one to the other, adding to each message a redundancy
code to ensure that Willie the warden has not modified the messages. The warden
knows the messages format (i.e., that they are composed by proper information
and a redundancy code) and he can read them, but he can’t modify without, sup-
posing an optimal redundancy code, Alice and Bob being aware of it. Alice and
Bob decide to lose some verification capacity in order to use some bits of the re-
ix
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duncancy code to send hidden information. This way, he will be able to elaborate
a jailbreak plan without Willie even know it. With this short story, that summa-
rizes grossly one of the methods presented by Simmons in [36], it can be seen
the difference between steganography and cryptography. With cryptography, Al-
ice and Bob would have avoided Willie to understand the messages, but Willie,
considering them suspicious, wouldn’t have allowed the messages from Alice ar-
rive to Bob, and viceversa. With steganography, certain bits that Willie takes as
redundancy checks (in this concrete example) are really bits of hidden data, so
Willie will still think Alice and Bob are exemplary prisoners and won’t block the
communication.
As every growing science, steganography keeps requiring each day more ad-
vanced techniques to fulfill its objectives, so it has became of crucial importance
to understand the foundations of the current steganographic techniques. Those
foundations are the underlying technologies, or, simply said, the place in which
we are hiding the information. Nowadays steganographic applications can be clas-
sified in several ways and are applied to several media: images, audio, text, com-
munication packages, etc. Being that so, this work is organized as follows: in the
first part we will make a short study of the processing and coding of audio signals,
as well as the Human Auditory System (HAS) properties. This part is important,
because without it, we won’t be able to justify some decisions taken afterwards,
but as it is not the main purpose of this work, this study might not be as deep as
it should be. In the second part, we will introduce in detail to the steganography
and steganalysis with an analysis of the current state of the art. In the third and
last part, we’ll present the method developed in this work, explaining the algo-
rithms which support it, its design, and finally, studing it from the most important
steganography’s points of view.
Part I
Audio signals processing and coding
1

3In this electronic era, in which computers, a digital medium, are its main pro-
tagonists, and more with the birth of digital storage devices, as compact discs,
the processes of digitalization of analog signals, i.e., the processes which take as
input an analog signal (with continuous domain and range) and produce as output
a digital signal (with discrete domain and range) are living a great growth. But,
with the relentless advance of the Internet, in which unlike in computers them-
selves (for which it is said that memory is “free”) we have the need to care about
reducing as much as possible the amount of data to transmit due to the current
limitations of bandwidth. So, now it is not enough just to digitalize the analog
signals: now we have to remove from the signals every single component that is
not indispensable, everything that, if removed, will produced a notable loss in the
signal quality. To the influence made by the Internet we have to add the one made
by the audio players, commonly known as mp3 players due to the first (or at least
the first to be globally known) compressed audio format.
Here we’ll carry out a brief study of the main elements which take part in the
audio signals processing and coding, and also the main properties of the Human
Auditory System (HAS) which let us differentiate the indispensable components
from the dispensable ones and which have helped to and create more efficient
audio compression algorithms and formats. The purpose of this part is to present
certain necessary principles needed to the next parts. Therefore, despite signal
processing and coding is a very complex and advanced science, we won’t spend
as much time as will be necessary to get a deep knowledge of the aspects here
introduced. For a deeper study on the matters dealt in the following chapters, we
recommend the reader to consult references therein.
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Chapter 1
Signals
First things first, we’ll give a proper definition of what we understand by signal. A
formal definition, distinguishing analog signals from digital ones, extracted from
[48] is:
Definition 1 ([48]). An analog signal s is a finite real-valued function s(t) of a
continuous variable t (called time), defined for all times on the intervale −∞ <
t < +∞. A digital signal s is a bounded discrete-valued sequence sn with a single
index n (called discrete time), defined for all times n = −∞...+∞.
I.e., a signal is a time changing function, where these instants of time are taken
from a continuous space in the case of analog signals and from a discrete space in
case of digital ones. Moreover, the values that an analog signal can take are infi-
nite (despite being delimited) as they are taken from a real interval; when talking
about digital signals, the values it takes in a given instant are discrete, and be-
ing delimited its range, it is therefore finite, to simplify the uantification process
carried out when transforming an analog signal to a digital one.
Usually, a signal is represented (we will see next why is so) by one (or several)
sinusoidal function which receives as parameters the angular frequency and the
instant in which the signal is to be represented, and it is multiplied by a real
constant. This equation has the appereance shown in 1.1
s(t) = Asin(ωt) (1.1)
Normally, a signal is decomposed in several sinusoidal functions, each of a
different frequency. This is why a signal only depends on the time paramter.
Therefore, these signals are no more than waves that can be composed in turn
by several waves with different frequencies. The frequency of a wave indicates the
number of cycles it completes in a second, being periodic the simple waves that
compose the more complex ones. The frequency is the inverse of the period, i.e.,
5
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the time a wave takes to complete a cycle. Depending on the wave’s frequency,
humans are able to perceive them with the auditory system or the visual system,
o we don’t perceive them at all. In the case that concerns us, the auditory, the
human audible frequencies rangre roughly from 20 Hz to 22 KHz (visible waves
have frequencies much higher, of the order of MHz), although this varies slightly
from one person to another.
1.1 Analog signals digitalization
So we have a real valued signal in continuous domain that, because of all this of
the digital world, we want to transform into a signal of discrete domain also with
discrete values. The process by means of which we choose what instants of the
continuous time domain we are going to represent in the new discrete time do-
main is called sampling. In this matter, we do have at our disposal a fundamental
theorem, due to Nyquist and Shannon (therefore its name: the Nyquist-Shannon
sampling theorem) that states the following:
Theorem 1 (Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem). Given a function s(t) with fre-
quencies no greater than B Hz, it can be fully reconstructed if the sampling fre-
quency used is greater or equal to 2B Hz.
This theorem tells us that, by using a suitable sampling frequency, we don’t lose
any information from the analog signal, at least if we use a continuous real valued
range. The problem is that, the range of values we want to use is discrete instead
of continuous, so we have to create a mapping to assign each continuous value of
the signal that the have now discretized in time a single discrete value. This pro-
cess is known as quantization, having several possible alternatives at our disposal.
For example, the called PCM method, from Pulse Code Modulation, consists of
predetermine the length of a quantization step , i.e., the distance between each two
adjacent pair of values the signal can take at a given moment. When the length of
this quantization step is fixed, we say we are using a linear or uniform strategy,
while if we use a variable length quantization step we talk about not linear or not
uniform quantization. In addition, we can also represent at each instant t, instead
of the value of the signal, i.e. s(t), the difference between the value at the instant
t and the immediately previous instant t − 1, case in which we say we are using
a DPCM or Differential Pulse Code Modulation technique. The error introduced
due to this signal quantization is known as quantization error. In the figures 1.1
and 1.2, extracted from [40] we can observe examples of uniform and not uniform
quantization and of PCM and DPCM, respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Examples ([40]) of uniform (up) and not uniform (down) quantization
of an analog signal.
The PCM technique and its derivatives are techniques of scalar quantization,
i.e., a single sample is quantified per time, while in vector quantization several
samples composing a vector are quantified per time. In this sense, we can think of
the signal as being divided in blocks of N samples, represented by N -dimensional
vectors, and with a codebook available, with L entries also of N dimensions, we
will assign the input vector the codebook which minimizes some measure, known
as distortion, which can be, e.g., the MSE (Mean Squared Error, the square of
the difference of two vectors) in a N -dimensional space. It is quite common to
chain several vector quantization processes, giving place to structures with dif-
ferent hierarchies (sequential, trees ...). For example, in the so called multi-step
vector quantization, several vector quantizers are sequentially chained, quantizing
with the first one the input vector, and with the following the error commited by
the immediately previous quantizer. This way we can obtain, with a few steps, a
very delimited error, at the same time that the codebooks size is becoming smaller.
In the figures 1.3 and 1.4 we can observe a two-dimensional representation of a
8 CHAPTER 1. SIGNALS
Figure 1.2: Examples ([40]) of PCM (center) and DPCM (down) of an analog
signal.
vector quantizer for two-dimensional vectors, and a multi-step vector quantizer,
respectively.
More details about these and other quantization techniques specially used for
acoustic signals can be found in [40]. For a deeper theoretical study of signal
quantization [18] can be consulted.
In the process of digitalization and processing of analog signals, many more
elements and concepts take part. Digital Filters take a very important part. A
Digital Filter is a system that performs mathematical operations over a digital
signal, with the purpose of producing certain transformations over it. Examples of
these mathematical transformations are the modification of the relative amplitudes
of the signal’s components or the total deletion of the frequencies above or below
a given threshold (low-pass filters and high-pass filters, respectively), or to let pass
1.1. ANALOG SIGNALS DIGITALIZATION 9
Figure 1.3: Example of vector quantizer in two-dimensional space
Figure 1.4: Example ([40]) of multi-step vector quantizer .
just the frequency components in a given range (band-pass filters). Digital filters
are usually represented by difference equations of this kind:
y(n) =
L∑
i=0
bix(n− i)−
M∑
i=1
aiy(n− i) (1.2)
In the equation 1.2 we can see that the filter’s output y(n) is given as a linear
combination of the current and past filter inputs, controlled by the parameters bi,
minus a linear combination of the past filter’s outputs, controlled by the parame-
ters ai. In such a kind of filter, the impulse response, i.e., the way in which the
filter reacts to a concrete change in the signal, is given by the equation 1.3.
h(n) =
L∑
i=0
biδ(n− i)−
M∑
i=0
aih(n− i) (1.3)
Where δ(m) is the Dirac Delta function, which takes a value other than 0 when
m = 0 and 0 otherwise. That is to say, for a impulse response calculation, given
by the equation 1.3, just the current input is taken into account (and not the past
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inputs, therefore the “impulse”). Also, the “shape” that the signal is being given
by the previous impulses is taken into account. This kind of filters are known
as Infinite-ength Impulse Response filters, or IIR (see 1.5), as each impulse will
affect, controlled by the ai coefficients, in an infinite manner during the following
impulse responses. When the ai coefficients are all 0, the filter is called Finite-
length Impulse Response filter, or FIR (see 1.6), which are modelled with the
equations 1.2 and 1.3, removing the second summatory in each of them, given
that the ai coefficients are all 0 and the corresponding additions are zeroed, having
therefore the impulses response a finite length. In the IIR as in the FIR, the number
of past inputs that are taken into account for the output calculation and for the
impulse response are known as the Digital Filter Order. In the 1.2 and 1.3 it
corresponds to the value L in the first summatory. For more details on digital
filters, see [40, 42].
Figure 1.5: IIR digital filter scheme.
Figure 1.6: FIR digital filter scheme.
To end with the basic concepts for the following chapters, we know as spectral
envelope of a signal to the set of bounds of its spectral lines. This definition can
be a little confusing, but the main idea is easilly understood with the figure 1.7.
A process or system that, given a concrete signal, returns its spectral envelope is
called spectral envelope follower.
1.2. TIME DOMAIN AND FREQUENCY DOMAIN: THE FOURIER SERIES11
Figure 1.7: Spectral envelope of a signal.
1.2 Time domain and frequency domain: the Fourier
series
Back in 1669, Isaac Newton was the first to observe and demonstrate, through
an experiment involving lenses of different curvatures, that white light was com-
posed by all the colors. As all those colors where impossible to see in plain sight,
he called them ghosts , in latin specter, what derived in spectrum. But, although
Newton was the first to observe this fact, he couldn’t get to the conclusion that,
those different colors, or spectrum, were produced by the different frequencies of
the waves conforming the light, probably due to the fact that in the 17th century
science didn’t know yet that light was composed by waves or particles. In fact,
with his lenses experiment, Newton concluded that it was composed by particles.
In the 18th century, the mathematics giant, Leonhard Euler, while observing the
vibrations originated by plucking strings fixed at both extremes, said that every
possible oscilatory movement generated in this way could be enunciated as a lin-
ear combination of sines satisfying certain conditions. But the matter was if any
ondulatory pattern could be specified as a sum of sines. If one holds a string at
an arbitrary point and pulls from it until creating a triangle with the string, after
releasing it, an ondulatory movement will be generated from which the initial in-
stant is when the string is the firstly created triangle. That initial state in which the
string is a triangle was for a long time supposed not to be representable with basic
sinusoidal modes. But then, at the first half of the 19th century, Joseph Fourier,
who was studying the problem of heat propagation in solids, came to the con-
clusion that certain solutions to his research had the form f(t)g(x), where g(x)
were sinusoidal functions. Studying those functions, Fourier stated that the most
general g(x) function could be enunciated as a linear combination of sinusoidal
12 CHAPTER 1. SIGNALS
functions, of the kind:
g(x) =
∞∑
k=0
(
ak sin(kx) + bk cos(kx)
) (1.4)
The equation 1.4 is nowadays known as Fourier series. In short, Fourier stated
that the question to our problem was affirmative. During some time the scientific
community rejected his hyphothesis (among his detractors were Fourier’s former
teachers and advisors, Laplace and Lagrange, who had quite a prestigious fame
at that moment). But finally, and thanks to Dirichlet, Riemann and Lebesgue’s
advances, the hypothesis was accepted.
Until now, he have defined a signal (analog or digital) depending on the values it
takes along time, but with the equation 1.4 this can be seen from other perspective
given that, as can be seen in the equation development, a signal (that, in the end, is
no more than a function) can be defined as the summatory of a linear combination
of every sinusoidal functions of distinct frequencies that compose it. In other
words, we can say: the signal s(x) behaves like a sine and a cosine of frequency
ω0 and amplitudes a0 and b0 respectively, plus a sine and a cosine of frequency
ω1 and amplitudes a1 and b1 respectively, etc. As in the acoustic signals case, we
know a person is sensitive to the signals with frequencies in the range of 20 Hz to
22 KHz, looking for the spectral components in that interval, we can represent a
signal from the frequencies that compose it instead of doing so from the values it
takes at every given instant.
Nevertheless, thinking a little more about what we have just said, we have sup-
posed the signals analyzed until now to be periodic, but that is not a requisite
for acoustic signals. Moreover, the concept of frequency takes sense only when
applied to periodic signals. But if instead of taking into account just armonic
frequencies, i.e., multiples of a base frequency, we also consider a continuous
frequency spectrum (e.g., for a wave to complete 1.25 cycles per second), we do
can represent not periodic signals. So, luckily for us, the results obtained before
are still valid even for non periodic signals. The process of transforming a time
domain defined signal, to the same signal defined in frequency domain, is known
as Fourier Transform, or FT, which, in case of digital signals is called Discrete
Fourier Transform, or DFT. Usually, instead of using the sines and cosines decom-
position, an equivalent imaginary numbers exponential decomposition is used.
The main DFT problem is its complexity, of O(N2) complex operations. Due to
this fact, thanks to the need of an effective digital signal processing, new several
algorithms have been developed that allows us to calculate the Fourier Transforms
and its inverses quite faster, given place to algorithms of cost O(N log(N)). This
kind of algorithms are known as Fast Fourier Transform, or FFT.
For more details about the Fourier Series and Transforms, see [48].
Chapter 2
Audio signals coding
Now that we have an idea of which are a signal components, how we can transform
it from time domain to frequency domain, how to sample it, etc., we can narrow
the kind of signals that interest us, which are acoustic signals. As was said in the
introduction of this first part, we are interested in removing each non indispensable
component from an acoustic signal, i.e., those that, after removing them, produce
no loss of sound quality. In this manner, the bitrate, i.e., the number of bits we are
going to need to represent the signal will be reduced considerably, something quite
desirable in telecommunications. With this goal in mind, we need to introduce
the so known human psychoacoustic model or Human Auditory System (HAS).
This model analyzes the characteristics of human ear, letting us know when a
given sound is perceived correctly, when a sound masks another one, or when
a sound masks a noise, among many other things. The acoustic signals coding
and decoding systems that make use of these principles are known as perceptual
codecs. Both are introduced below.
2.1 Human psychoacoustic model
The very last addressee of the acoustic signals we want to digitize and encode
will be a human being, and in humans, it is the auditory organ, the ear, where the
“transformations” that let us perceive the acoustic waves take place. Essentially,
such transformations begin in the middle ear, where the acoustic waves cause
vibrations in the eardrum, who moves the hammer and the anvil, transfering the
latters these vibrations to the cochlea, who contains the basilar membrane, which
varies in mass and rigidity through all its length, and produces different responses
in the neural receptors connected to it, depending on the acoustic wave frequency.
Even shorter, the human ear acts as a frequency-space transformer.
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Figure 2.1: Human ear.
So we can think of the human ear as if it was composed by several band-pass
filters disposed all along the basilar membrane, being each one of them sensitive
to a given frequency range. In the human psychoacoustic model, this is known as
critical bands of frequency (also known as Barks, and, as we have already said,
they all have different bandwidth1.
The Sound Pressure Level, or SPL, is the standar metric used to measure the
intensity of the sound, given in decibels, or dB, which is a measure unit relative
to a fixed quantity, or reference level, which in sound is given by the absolute
threshold of hearing in quiet to the human ear. That being so, to measure the
intensity of an auditory impulse, we use the formula 2.1.
LSPL = 20 log10(p/p0)dB (2.1)
Where p is the sound pressure of the stimulus in Pascals (Pa) and p0 is the
reference level, which, for humans, is equal to 20µPa.
The aim here is to be able to say when a given characteristic of an acoustic
signal is dispensable and when it is not. To achieve it we use what we have
learnt about the frequency-space transformation process that takes place in the
human ear in conjunction with something that has been mencioned before, i.e.,
the phenomena of masking between tones, tones and noise and noise and tones.
To be even clearer, to define this masking phenomena, if given to tones of different
frequencies, we say that tone A masks tone B if, when certain conditions related
1In http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0072495855/student_view0/chapter19
a very ilustrative animation of the facts just explained can be seen
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to the relative frequencies, intensities or time instants of both tones are fulfilled,
make the tone B inaudible while being the tone A audible, i.e., when the tone
B is masked by the tone A. Moreover, when this is produced between two tones
we talk about tone masking tone; when a tone maks a noise we talk about tone
masking noise; when a noise masks a tone it is noise masking tone; and finally
the masking between noises is called noise masking noise. The abbreviations
TMT, TMN, NMT and NMN, respectively, are also commonly used. Relatively
to frequency masking, the nearer in frequency the two tones are (or noises, or
tones and noises), more effective the masking will be, although this frequency
masking can happen even between frequencies in different Barks. The fact of
classifying the signals in different critical bands, or Barks, just derives from the
human ear properties, which has different sensibility to the different frequencies.
To correctly simulate this frequency masking phenomenon, a set of filters is the
common approach (see 1.1 for some comments about digitalization) for dividing
an acoustic signal in its “basic” frequency components (applying before a Fourier
Transform to the signal in time domain to obtain its frequency equivalent) and
obtain a classification of them. Once done so, the frequential masking functions
can be applied. This process of frequency masking is also known as simultaneous
masking as it takes place between stimuli happening in the same instant of time.
An idealized critical bands model, using the filter bank that can be observed in
figure 2.2. A filter bank is a set of filters, which are usually disposed parallely,
such that only one of the filters produces an output for a given stimulus (acoustic
signal), being the filter that produces the output the one that represents the gap
of frequencies to which the received acoustic signal belongs. Pass-band filters
are commonly used for filter banks. In figure 2.3 the TMN process and relative
concepts can be seen graphically. These are the masker (tone), i.e., the tonal
stimulus that will mask a noise (or tone); the masking threshold, i.e., the threshold
above which the noise will be audible and below which it won’t be; the minimum
threshold of masking, that represents the minimum masking threshold inside the
given critical band that the masking tone belongs to; the Signal to Noise Ratio
SNR, being the difference between the tone and noise intensities; the Signal to
Mask Ratio , or SMR, which is the difference between the tone intensity and the
masking threshold; and the Noise to Mask Ratio or NMR which is the difference
between the noise intensity and the masking threshold.
Although the simultaneous masking may be the most commonly exploited, the
temporal masking, or non-simultaneous masking, i.e., when a sound masks an-
other occurring at a different instant. Of this kind, the post-masking is the most
common, and it is produced when one sound masks another happening at a sub-
sequent instant. Depending on the intensity of each sound, this post-masking can
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Figure 2.2: Idealized filter bank for critical bands ([31]).
Figure 2.3: Simultaneous masking ([31]).
take place even roughly 200ms after. Also, and despite it may seem contrary
to intuition, pre-masking is also possible, and as the name suggests, it happens
when one sound masks another that have happened at a slightly previous instant,
at most, 100ms before. These effects are represented in the figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Temporal or non-simultaneous masking ([31]).
Now that we know how the human ear works, and how we can simulate the pro-
cesses that take place in it using the masking phenomena, we can determine which
are the dispensable elements that compose an acoustic signal and eliminate them,
producing considerable savings in terms of storage space and bitrate. Note also
that we can remove elements which, despite by removing them we will introduce
little changes in the signal, they may not be very important for the acoustic quality
but may produce drastic improvements in terms of space and bitrate usage. Here
comes the trade-off game between quality and costs requirements (measured in
terms of disk space and bitrate) and which will vary depending on the intended
usage for the resulting acoustic signal and its addressees. If the addressee is some-
one with little musical knowledge and a poor (in terms of sensitivity) ear, a great
part of these slightly audible but not very important components can be discarded;
but if the addressee is a professional musician, the balance will be inverted and
even removing the least important signal components might be detected.
Lastly, the concept of Perceptual Entropy or PE, introduced by Johnston in sev-
eral articles ([11]) defines the amount of relevant information contained in an
acoustic signal. Basically, it tells us how many bits we should use (or how many
bits we can ignore) to encode in a transparent way an acoustic signal. We say
that a signal can be transparently encoded or compressed when the result of the
decodification or decompression is a signal with the very same information than
the original signal. In his resarch, Johnston concluded that a wide variety of au-
dio with CD quality could be transparently encoded with a bitrate of 2.1 bits per
sample. Note 16 bits is the most commonly number of bits per sample for CD
quality, and, with a sampling rate of 44.1KHz, a reduction to 2.1 bits per sample
entails great improvements (savings of roughly 87.5% of the bits in respect of the
original signal).
For more details on the psychoacoustic model, see [31] or chapter 5 of [40].
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2.2 Quantization, Bit Allocation and entropy coding
Once known the dispinsable elements of an acoustic signal, usually, it is turn to
the processes of quantization, bit allocation and entropy coding of the original
signal, always having in mind the results obtained in the psychoacoustic analysis.
We already introduced to quantization techniques in section 1.1, so the reader
is referred there and the references therein for a detailed study of quantization
techniques. The processes of bit allocation serve to specify the amount of bits to
use at a given instant. For example, during silence intervals, the amount of bits
used to “sample the silence” will be reduced, decreasing therefore the bitrate and
making possible to increase the bits to use for peaks in the signal.
Lastly, the entropy coding, consists in lossless compression (e.g. Huffman cod-
ing) of the result obtained by the previous processes.
In figure 2.5 it can be seen how all this concepts of psychoacoustic model, quan-
tization processes, bit allocation and entropy coding are combined to produce a
generic perceptual codec.
Figure 2.5: Generic scheme of perceptual encoder with quantization, bit allocation
and entropy coding modules ([40]).
2.3 Perceptual codecs
The word codec results from the contraction of coder and decoder and it is used
to refer to the process by means of which a digital signal is codified and decod-
ified. When a codec uses concepts like the ones seen in section 2.1 to remove
the dispensable components of the input signal, it is said to be a perceptual codec.
Codecs can be classified also into lossy and lossles codecs. A codec will be a loss-
less codec when, after the process of coding and decoding, the resulting signal is
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bit to bit identical to the original signal; a codec will be a lossy codec when the
resulting signal differs from the original one. Given that perceptual codec use psy-
choacoustic models to remove the dispensable components of the audio signals,
the resulting signal of a coding and decoding process in such perceptual codec will
differ from the original, so perceptual codecs belong to the lossy codecs category.
In the field of perceptual audio codecs, the most known codec and the one that
has been used the most is MP3 codec (MP3 stands from MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3),
standarized in the ISO/IEC-11172 (see chapter 3 of [41] for a deeper MP3 format
study). As MP3 is the most used audio codec, it is very usual to talk about MP3
player instead of saying compressed audio player. Other audio codecs are AAC
(Advanced Audio Coding) from MPEG-2 standard; the AVS (Audio Video Stan-
dard) codec which integrates audio and video coding; Microsoft’s WMA format
(Windows Media Audio); or the format in which this work is focused in: the codec
Vorbis. Vorbis is a free and open codec developed by Christopher Montgomery,
belonging to the Xiph.Org foundation. In section 2.4 we study in detail the Vorbis
codec.
So, perceptual codecs exploit a psichoacoustic model to save in storage space
and bitrate needed to represent the final signal. Moreover, these transformations
over the input signal take place mainly at the encoder side, producing encoders
heavier than decoders. In figure 2.6 a generic model of perceptual codec can be
seen.
Figure 2.6: Generic perceptual codec ([31]).
2.4 The Vorbis codec
Vorbis, named after a character in Terry Pratchett’s Discworld series, is a lossy
perceptual audio codec, developed by the free software foundation Xiph.org, be-
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ing Christopher Montgomery the creator and main developer. Its history begins in
1998, although it wasn’t until 2002 that the stable version 1.0 was launched, be-
ing libvorbis the reference library2 The official library is mantained by Xiph.org,
although there are many other modifications, some of them quite known, such as
aoTuV. Being Vorbis a lossy perceptual codec, it is in the same league as MP3,
AAC, AVS, etc., although, obviously, it has differences with them.
In the following subsections we’ll study the codec, to let us have an enough
knowledge level of it which let us fully understand the later parts of this work.
Again, the purpose of this work is not to be a Vorbis reference book, so it may be
parts that won’t be exhaustively studied here. The reader is urged to consult the
references in the following sections to acquire a deeper knowledge of the Vorbis
codec. Nevertheless, we already state here that the best way to get to know Vorbis
in detail is to visit its web page ([44]) and Xiph.org’s site ([13]) and follow the
advices given there.
2.4.1 Psychoacoustic model
As we have already said in section 2.3, perceptual codecs are those which use
psychoacoustic principles to remove the dispensable information contained in the
audio tracks to be codified. To do so, they follow a psychoacoustic model simulat-
ing in some way the human ear characteristics. Nevertheless, this does not imply
that every perceptual codec uses the same psychoacoustic model, in fact, despite
their purpose is the same, they usually utilize different models. This is mainly the
most important reason why it is not advisable (as long as it is possible to avoid) to
transform one audio track coded with the codec A, to a coficiation with codec B.
Due to de differences between the perceptual models of A and B, besides of not
being able to recover the information lost in the process of compressing the audio
track with the codec A, we will also lose the information that the codec B con-
siders dispensable, accumulating the losses of both processes. In some concrete
cases, this might not be as dramatic as it seems, e.g., Speex (an audio codec, also
from the Xiph.org foundation, designed to compress speech) and Vorbis utilizes a
similar psychoacoustic model, therefore, the losses won’t be as large as we could
think. But this is not the general case and, as said before, this practice is generally
discouraged. This subsection presents the Vorbis’ psychoacoustic model.
Vorbis follows a model in which the encoder is heavier than the decoder. Among
this extra load that the encoder side receives, we can find the psychoacoustic sim-
2The version at the moment of starting this work was 1.2.3, dated in the 10th of July of 2009,
although during the development of this work, version 1.3.1 was lanuched on the 26th of March
of 2010. Due to the advanced state of the project at that date, the version used here is the 1.2.3,
although after a first glance, there seem to be no substantial changes in the model that can make a
future portability to be complicated.
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ulation processes. Grosso modo, what the codec does is to compute, we’ll se how
now, a curve, named floor, wich essentially contains the basic information of the
acoustic wave. This floor will aftewards be removed from the signal, leaving only
some residual data that will be treated differently. To compose the floor curve,
some masking concepts seen in section 2.1 are used. At one hand, for each frame
a TMT curve will be computed. This curve will set the masking thresholds for
other tones, given the tonal components of the frame, i.e., it tells us the maximum
amplitude that a tone of frequency µ can have for it to not be audible, or to be
masked by the tonal components of the current frame. In the other hand, from the
spectral envelope of the noise in the current frame, to which a bias curve is added,
a noise mask is generated for the frame. These two curves, masks for tonal and
noise components of the frame, are now superposed, choosing the maximum of
both at each frequency, to give place to the aforementioned floor curve.
Besides the floor computatoin, it also takes place at the beginning, an analysis of
the “short term” characteristics of the signal, such as sudden changes (impulses)
or echoes, by means of which the length of the frames is chosen (Vorbis makes use
of two different frame lengths, obviously, one shorter and one longer, being their
lengths a power of 2 between 64 and 8192 that must be previously specified). Part
of this analysis, that characterizes the temporal events in short time intervals, is
also used to choose between Vorbis’ different codificaction modes for the current
frame (as we’ll see below, one mode defines, among other things, the transform
method, the window, the codebooks to use, etc.).
At last, the floor curve is extracted from the acoustic signal, producing the resid-
ual spectral components, or residues, which could be subject to a coupling pro-
cess. Finally, both the residual and floor components will be compressed with
Huffman tables and/or VQ (Vector Quantization) to produce the final compressed
audio. This process, to the point (included) of extracting the floor curve and ob-
taining the residues corresponds to the boxes of Time-frequency analysis, Psy-
choacoustic analysis and Bit-allocation of the block diagram of a general percep-
tual codec shown in figure 2.6.
The floor-residue abstraction is going to be essential from now on, so it is worth
some insistence. The floor vector spans from −140dB to 0dB and it is used as
a quantizer to obtain the residue vector. To do so, the original vector is divided
by the floor vector converted to linear scale, element by element (i.e., frequency
coefficient by frequency coefficient). This way, the residue vector can be under-
stood as the quantized values. The fact that the residue calculation is made in
linear scale while the human ear works in logarithmic scale, makes the coeffi-
cients which are over the floor vector to be codified with increasing precission,
while the coefficients below, will be codified with decreasing precisison.
In figure 2.7, extracted from [43] can be seen a block diagram of Vorbis encoder.
Note that, for the analysis just explained, FFT and MDCT transformations are
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previously realized, as Vorbis codec works in the frequency domain. For a deeper
study of Vorbis’ psychoacoustic model, see [43].
Figure 2.7: Block diagram of Vorbis encoder ([43]).
2.4.2 Configuration and format
Vorbis format is well defined by means of the decodification process in the sense
that a encoder that produces a data stream readable by the reference decoder can
be considered as a valid Vorbis codec. On the other side, for a decoder to be
considered as valid, it has to fullfil all the requirements (configuration modes,
data compression, etc.) of the reference decoder. In this subsection we will see
the main configuration elements of Vorbis, getting a general idea of its format. In
[16] the full specifications can be consulted. We’ll start with the general aspects
and end with a fine detail level.
2.4.2.1 Global configuration
The global configuration of the data stream is composed by some basic elements
like the sample rate, the number of sampled channels, the Vorbis version, “guides”
related to the bitrate and a listing of the configuration instances (modes, mappings,
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etc.). Related to these bitrate “guides”, it is worth to mention that Vorbis supports
variable bitrate or VBR and managed bitrate.
In the VBR case, the number of bits produced at the output can be variable with
respect to the time (e.g., a silence instant won’t require the same bits quantity as an
instant with saveral instruments playing). This configuration is usually the best,
as it is oriented to obtain a high sound quality. In this case (with VBR) ther is no
need for specifying any aforementioned guide.
For managed or controled bitrates, the purpose is to limit the minimum and
maximum bitrates. These values won’t be exceeded (to measure them, mean val-
ues calculated from the whole bitstream are used, not concrete instant values). To
avoid exceeding these limits, different bit-reservoir algorithms are available for
use depending on the audio characteristics. For example, one can choose to ac-
cumulate free bits in the reservoir to have some free space when a spike occurs,
or to consume bits from the reservoir when possible to avoid having the reservoir
full when a silence comes. These examples are, in general, the both extremes of
the strategy that can be chosen. Intermediate behaviours are achieved by means
of more or less aggressive psychoacoustic models. Anyway, this managed bitrate
approach is advisable just in cases in which we have bandwidth or memory limi-
tations, as their main purpose is not to produce high quality compressed signals,
but to not exceed the established limits, producing questionable quality signals
sometimes. This is the main reason why Vorbis default mode is VBR. As opposed
for VBR, with managed bitrates it is necessary to specify the bitrates guides, con-
sisting of minimum, maximum and average desired bitrates.
2.4.2.2 Modes
While the global configuration refers to the whole bitstream, a mode referse solely
to a concrete frame, although, of course, it can be several frames using the same
mode. This way, choosing one mode or another we aim to use the configuration
that best fits a given frame. Modes definitions include the frame size (short or
long), the window to use (in Vorbis I is only of type 0, the so called Vorbis win-
dow), the transform to use for time to frequency conversion (always MDCT in
Vorbis I) and a mapping identifier.
2.4.2.3 Mappings
A frame mapping contains specific information about how coupling between resid-
ual signals of different channels is done, and a list of submappings consisting
in groupings of different channels to be encoded and decoded using the same
submap. This way, it is possible to encode channels with different characteristics
24 CHAPTER 2. AUDIO SIGNALS CODING
using methods in concordance to them: for example, in 5.1, it won’t be adequate
to encode in the same manner the bass channel and the rest of the channels.
2.4.2.4 Floor
In section 2.4.1 we saw how the floor vector is obtained from an acoustic signal in
Vorbis. This vector is calculated for each channel of an audio frame and, besides
the studied properties, it is used as a whitening filter given that, after subtracting
it from the original signal, we obtain a residual signal whose power spectral den-
sity is quite more uniform that it was in the original signal. Once obtained the
floor vector, it is compressed (encoder) or decompressed (decoder) using entropy
coding methods.
In Vorbis I there are two types of floor, type Floor 0 and Floor 1. Given that type
0 has not been used in any known encoder after Xiph.org’s beta 4, we won’t study
it here. According to type 1, it depicts the original curve by segment interpolation,
in a logarithmic amplitude scale measured in dB, and linear in frequency.
Figure 2.8: Representation of a floor curve with Floor 1 method ([16]).
2.4.2.5 Residue
The residual components of the signal are the result of subtracting in each channel
the corresponding floor vector, representing the details of the acoustic signal. In
many cases, the residual components of different channels have much in common,
and using coupling algorithms for channels, in conjunction with entropy coding,
great savings in space and bitrate are achieved.
In Vorbis there are three abstractions regarding the way of coding the residual
vectors wich, basically, differ in how the distinct vectors of each channel are inter-
leaved. It is worth to mention that, although there is one residual vector for each
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frame’s channel, due to the fact that residual vectors, unlike floor vectors, do can
be subject to coupling, it is necessary to carry out an uncoupling of the residual
values read to obtain a residual vector for each frame’s channel received at the
decoder. In all three types of residue formats, the residual vectors are partitioned,
classifying the resulting partitions depending on the codebook(s) used to encode
them. So, each partiotion will have its associated classification vector. Usually,
each vector is encoded as a additive sum of several VQ passes, to obtain more ef-
ficient codebooks (in Vorbis I the maximum number of passes is 8, being possible
to use different codebooks at each pass).
Abstractions 0 and 1 of residual vectors encoding differ from abstraction 2 in
that they do not interleave the residues of different channels before encoding them.
And between them, the difference is that abstraction 0 the values are interleaved
depending on the dimensions of the codebook used in each pass for each partition,
while in type 1 the values are encoded directly in the original order. Therefore,
and for the sake of clarity, we can talk of two kind of interleaving: internal inter-
leaving, in which values of a single partition are interleaved between themselves;
and external interleaving, in which residual vectors of different channels are in-
terleaved. Abstraction 0 uses internal interleaving, abstraction 0 does not use any
intearleaving and abstraction 2 uses external interleaving. Normally, abstraction
2 is treated as a variant of abstraction 1, given that, after applying external inter-
leaving, the resulting vector is encoded without internal interleaving.
In the following example, taken from [16], it is shown how a partition of size 8
will be encoded using abstraction 0 with codebooks of size 8, 4, 2 and 1, respec-
tively, for each pass:
original residual vector: [0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7]
codebook of dimension 8: [0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7]
codebook of dimension 4: [0 2 4 6], [1 3 5 7]
codebook of dimension 2: [0 4], [1 5], [2 6], [3 7]
codebook of dimension 1: [0], [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]
While with abstraction 1, starting with the same vector and using the codebooks
of equal dimensions, and the same order, the result will be what follows:
original residual vector: [0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7]
codebook of dimension 8: [0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7]
codebook of dimension 4: [0 1 2 3], [4 5 6 7]
codebook of dimension 2: [0 1], [2 3], [4 5], [6 7]
codebook of dimension 1: [0], [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]
In figure 2.9 it is shown an schema of the procces of encoding 3 residual vectors
(A, B and C) using abstraction 2.
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Figure 2.9: Encoding and decoding of residual vectors (A, B and C) using residue
abstraction 2 ([16]).
2.4.2.6 Codebooks
Vorbis I uses entropy coding to save space when storing the audio data of each
sample. The entropy coding method used in Vorbis is Huffman coding. This com-
pression type is alwaysd applied, and it also gives two options: storing the result
of the Huffman coding or using the obtained values like an offset in a codebook
obtained with vector quantization. The techniques of vector quantization used in
Vorbis ar lattice vector quantization and tessellated (or foam) vector quantiza-
tion. In this matter, Vorbis presents one of its most different characterstics with
respect to the other perceptual codecs. As opposed to them, Vorbis stores the
codebooks, Huffman and VQ, in the datastream, concretely in the setup header,
which is the third of three headers. Vorbis usually includes utilities to gener-
ate oneself codebooks, although the common practice is to use the precalculated
codebooks included in Vorbis, generated from training data. Despite this, the
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fact of including the codebooks in the stream’s header, gives us the possibility
of creating spetialized codebooks for certain types of audio and makes easier the
compatibility among Vorbis versions. Theoretically, the size the codebooks can
reach is unlimitted, although is advised not to use codebooks greater than roughly
4KB. Therefore, including the codebooks does not produce much overhead and
the advantages are quite important.
2.4.3 Decoding procedure
As Vorbis I format is well defined by the specifications of the decoding process,
the latter will be introduced here briefly. Nonetheless, this will also let us to get a
good image of the encoding process. Once again, a more detailed analysis of the
process can be found in sections 1.3 and 4.3 of [16].
2.4.3.1 Headers
In Vorbis I the generated bitstreams have 3 types of headers, and in every bitstream
the three of them must appear. In what follows we explain the order they must
preserve:
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Identification header
This header identifies the bitstream as a Vorbis bitstream, specifies the ver-
sion and other general characteristics of the contained audio, such as the
sample rate and the number of channels.
Comment header
Includes informative comments about the bitstream. Examples of these
comments can be the author, title, genre, etc. Although this header is
mandatory for every bitstream, it can be void. More information about this
header can be found in [16, 14].
Setup header
This header contains detailed information about the codec configuration
used in the bitstream, in order of appeareance: codebooks, time-frequency
domain transforms, floors, residues, mappings and modes. In the audio
stream packets, the values obtained in the reference header will be refer-
enced, therefore, before starting to encode/decode any audio packet, the
setup header (in fact, the three headers) must be read. There also exist re-
lations between the elements of the header, as we’ll see in the following
sections. Image 2.10 gives a global idea of the codec configuration.
Figure 2.10: Configuration diagram of Vorbis I streams ([16]).
2.4.3.2 Packet type decoding
The three different headers in Vorbis, with the audio packets, make a total of 4
possible packet types in a Vorbis bitstream. Given that the headers must be the
first three packets in every bitstream, every packet after the last of the three headers
(the setup header) will be an audio packet. A packet of a different type after the
setup header is an error, and must be ignored.
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2.4.3.3 Mode decoding
We have already seen, in the subsection 2.4.2, what does a mode represents in an
audio bitstream packet. A mode comes encoded as an integer number, which is
used directly as an offset in the bitstream’s modes listing that was specified in the
setup header.
2.4.3.4 Window slope calculation
We have also seen that in Vorbis the window used is the so called Vorbis’ window.
We also know that frames can be short or long, being these two values powers of
two in the range between 64 and 8192 samples per frame. Moreover, Vorbis uses
MDCT to convert samples from time domain to frequency domain. To make the
transform be unitary, in the decoding process, we have to overlap adjacent frames
(the second half of the “left” frame with the first half of the “right” frame) to re-
cover the original audio. The way in which two adjacent frames are overlapped is
given by the size of the frames. When two frames have the same size, no modifi-
cation is needed in the window’s shape; while when the two frames have different
size, the shape of the window in the long frame has to be modified in order to
make the overlapping correctly. In case of Vorbis window, this modification can
be defined by the function 2.2:
y = sin(0.5 ∗ pi sin2((x+ 5)/n ∗ pi)) (2.2)
Where n is the long frame size. In the figure 2.11, extracted from [16], two over-
lapping examples, of long-long and long-short frames and the resulting windows,
are shown.
2.4.3.5 Floor decoding
Given that the floor vectors can be decoded in two different ways, the submaps
must specify what type of floor has been used in each channel. Afterwards, the
floor vectors will be encoded/decoded in channel order and before of the residue
encoding/decoding.
Once decoded the type of floor used to encode a concrete channel, we have to
proceed depending on the concrete type to decode the curve. In floor 1, which is
the one that affects us, the floor vector is divided in partitions, each one of them
belonging to a concrete class; each class will have a master codebook and several
codebooks. The normal codebooks are used to encode the values of each partition,
while the master codebook is used to encode the codebooks that are used in the
partition. It is important that it is possible that, for some concrete channel, the
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Figure 2.11: Overlapping of frames and resulting windows ([16]). At the top,
overlapping of long-long frames; below, overlapping of long-short frames
floor vector is not encoded, case in which there will be a flag marking that the
corresponding floor is not being used. This implies that the residue vector of the
same channel won’t be encoded either, but one must be careful when the residues
are coupled, given that a residue vector to 0 and a residue vector distinct to 0,
once coupled, produce two vectors, being both distinct to 0. Therefore, before
uncoupling, it might seem that the corresponding vector is encoded, although that
is not the case.
More information about the procedure of configuration and decodification of
floor vectors, including quite enlightening pseudocodes, can be found in section 6
“Floor type 0 setup and decode” for floor 0, and in section 7 “Floor type 1 setup
and decode” for floor 1, of the Vorbis I specifications ([16]).
2.4.3.6 Residue decoding
In residual vectors we find first that they may have been subject to coupling. In
this case, although the total number of (coupled) vectors is the same as the num-
ber of channels, we have to uncouple them (see next subsection: Residue cou-
pling/uncoupling. If residue vectros are or aren’t coupled will depend on the cur-
rent frame mapping.
Besides, we know that the residue vectors can be encoded in three different
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ways, being specified the current encoding used in the frame’s submaps. There-
fore, the encoding/decoding of residue vectors will also depend in the encod-
ing type in use, but, conversely than for floor vectors, the residues will be en-
coded/decoded in submap order, not channel order.
2.4.3.7 Residue coupling/uncoupling
Strictly speaking, we have already seen one of the two coupling mechanisms that
Vorbis contributes for residue coupling. This is type 2 of residue encoding. Briefly
recalling what we saw in the section introducing to Vorbis’ residue types in sec-
tion 2.4.2, the residue 2, before encoding the residue vectors of each channel,
interleaves them, in such a way that the first vector of the first channel is followed
by the first vector of the second channel and so on until the first vector of the last
channel, after which the second vector of the first channel is included, and so on.
But, beside this interleaved coupling, Vorbis allows a second coupling type, which
can be used independently (i.e., with residues 0 or 1) or jointly with residue 2, in-
creasing the benefits of channel coupling. This second coupling type is known
as Square Polar Mapping. Given the residue vectors, they are transformed into
polar representation, but, given that this representation involves trigonometric op-
erations (whith a high computational cost), instead of using normal polar repre-
sentation (circular), a square polar representation is used. This means that, instead
of mapping the cartesian coordinates into a circunference, they are mapped into
a square. So, beginning with two original residue vectors, that will represent a
unique point in cartesian coordinates, by means of simple addition and substrac-
tion operations instead of trigonometric operations, two values will be obtained,
one of which will be the magintude and the other the angle, representing both of
them in a unique way the original point. In case that the audio stream is composed
by more than two channels, say n, the process will be repeated until ending with
1 magnitude value and n − 1 correlation values between magnitude/angle, as the
values that the angle can take are limited by the magintude (for lesser magintudes,
less possible values the angle could take).
For both coupling with residue 2 or for Square Polar Maping independently, or
both at the same time, a lossless coupling is achieved. In [15] a more detailed
analysis of these procedures can be seen.
2.4.3.8 Floor-residue union
This step is quite simple, as we just have to multiply, for each channel, each
floor curve element by the corresponding element in the residue vector, as the
encoding process produces the residue by dividing, also for each element, the
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Figure 2.12: Vorbis’ Square Polar maping example ([15]).
original value of the channel by the obtained floor value (a division is used instead
of a subtraction because the amplitude unit, the dB, is a quotient of logarithms,
being the divisor the reference level).
2.4.3.9 IMDCT
We shall recall that Vorbis works in frequency domain, so, the resulting curve in
each channel of the previous step must be converted to time domain. As Vorbis
uses the MDCT, this is realized with its inverse transform, the IMDCT. The win-
dow used in this transformation is the Vorbis window, introduced in subsection
2.4.2.
2.4.3.10 Data overlapping and caching
The MDCT is a transform with overlapping, i.e., when applying the inverse trans-
form we must overlap each two consecutive blocks to obtain one block at the
output. This produces a more resistant reconstruction to undesirable differences,
or artifacts, between the original and encoded audio. Therefore, we have to store
the second half of each frame to overlap it with the first half of the following frame
once it is available (note that, as we saw with Vorbis window, long frames can be
subject to modifications, therefore this overlapping is not alwasy straight). Once
available the two halves, they must be added to produce the final audio data ready
to be returned.
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2.4.3.11 Data return
The data obtained in the previous step is already data ready to be returned. But
Vorbis also establishes an implicit channel order, depending on the number of
channels:
One channel: Monophonic. Existing just one channel, the order is, obvi-
ously, irrelevant.
Two channels: Stereo. Channel order: left, right.
Three channels: 1d-surround. Channel order: left, center, right.
Four channels: quadraphonic sound. Channel order: front left, front right,
rear lef, rear right.
Five channels: 5 channels surround. Channel order: front left, front center,
front right, rear left, rear right.
Six channels: 5.1 surround. Channel order: front left, front center, front
right, rear left, rear right, LFE (Los Frequency Effects) channel.
More than six channels: The channel use and order must be specified by
the application.
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Part II
Steganography and steganalysis
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Chapter 3
Introduction to steganography
Until now he have spoken about steganography as a set of methods for hiding
information. Strictly speaking this is not a hundred percent correct definition, as
the set of methods used to hide information is in fact called information hiding
methods, being steganography a subset of them. Information hiding is the science
that includes any method that serves for hiding any type of information, what-
ever its nature is, its means, or its purposes (see figure 3.1). Therefore, inside the
information hiding we can speak of watermarking, which consists in introduc-
ing little amounts of information to serve as copyrights to protect authors’ rights;
fingerprints, also small amounts of information but this time with the purpose to
identify a concrete object, in a way that afterwards it is possible to trace a chain
of illegal copies to the original source (a technique known as traitor tracing [34];
the steganography, strictly speaking, focuses in transmitting high amounts of in-
formation in an imperceptible manner, although less robust; and yet another field,
totally different, but still information hiding, is the anonimity, wich with tech-
niques like Onion Routing [19] allows the original sender of a given information
to hide his identity to the recipient.
Each one of the mentioned information hiding branches has its characteristics in
terms that we’ll see next (robustness, capacity...) and that made certain algorithms
more or less appropriate to achieve the desired purpose.
In the last years, information hiding techniques have been subject to a great
increase due to some factors tightly related to the digital information. In [32]
some of them are introduced, and we comment here the ones that may have had
more influence in the past, or may have it in the future:
· A great driving force of information hiding techniques is the music industry.
Due to the new audio storage and coding technologies, introduced before in
part I “Audio signals processing and coding”, the transmission of music and
video has been made enormously easier, with CDs, Internet or even mobile
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phones. Therefore, this easyness to obtain the so considered illegal copies
has increased drastically. By means of watermarking techniques, the disco-
graphic companies and authors of those contents can introduce copyrights
in a hidden and imperceptible way for the rest of the people, being able
afterwards to identify a song as theirs; or hide fingerprints to allow them
identify the source of an illegal copies chain. Note that, using cryptogra-
phy to this purpose, watermarks or fingerprints, although ciphered, will be
totally visible by everyone (like disturbing noises), and, despite they will
be “nonsenses”, one could just remove them to thwart the control intent of
whom who introduced them. In the same way that for music, images and
video have the same problem.
· Some election and electronic money schemes make use of hiding commu-
nications. This is the same philosophy than the prisoners in the preface of
this work: if nobody knows the very existence of the information, no one
can access it, and therefore it can’t be stolen or modified.
· At the “bad guys” side, for terrorist groups, criminals, etc., it is essential
to be able to transmit and store information in a hidden way. And, being
terrorists interested in this methods, the counter intelligence organizations
that fight them are interested in understanding those methods, to be capable
of breaking them and fight against terrorism. It is known (or beleived) that
some terrorist organizations like E.T.A. or Al Qaeda may have used, or
being using, steganographic techniques (besides crypgographic methods) to
hide and transmit information imperceptibly.
Obviously, and like for practically every science branch, all information hid-
ing applications may have legitimate and illegitimate uses, although not for every
case the division is quite clear. Of course, the use that the terrorist organiza-
tions is totally undesirable, what makes the advancements in the countermeasures
( steganalysis, i.e., the techniques that study how to break or cancel steganogra-
phy effects) to be a very important element for intelligence and defence services.
In other situations, like the inclusion of watermarks or fingerprints into songs or
videos to avoid illegal copies, the border between what is right and wrong is much
fuzzier (the majority of the authors and discographic companies consider wrong,
while the majority of the consumers have a much more relaxed concept of illegal-
ity). Whatever the case is, it is not the objective of this work to analyze ethical
questions, although, in the other hand, science advancement is difficult to avoid,
so all this ethical digressions may not lead to fruitful completions. Therefore, and
leaving aside all this matters, we’ll introduce here the terminology, characteris-
tics and methods of steganography, studying the most relevants in a little more
detailed level.
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3.1 Terminology
To start, we’ll introduce some basic terminology to ease the understanding and
avoid confusions. The terminology used here will follow the guides given in [33]:
· It is known as embedded information or hidden information, the information
which is secretly sent.
· The audio track, image, video, text, or in essence, the data among which
the information is to be embedded, receives the name of carrier or cover.
Depending on the specific kind of cover, one can also say cover audio, cover
image, etc.
· The object resulting of the insertion of the information to embed into the
carrier is called stego-object. As before, the terms stego-audio, stego-image,
etc. can also be used.
· The key (which may have been) used in the process is known as stego-key,
although when the context does not give place to doubts, just key can be
used.
3.2 Main characteristics
The different branches of the information hiding science are distinguised by the
pursued purposes, making desirable and even mandatory certain characteristics
depending on the given branch. Therefore, we’ll proceed to introduced the char-
acteristics each branch may or must have ([10, 41]):
Perceptual invisibility
Perceptual invisibility refers to the extent at which the hidden information
must pass unnoticed to everyone senses, e.g., to hearing in case of audio
steganography or to sight in case of image steganography. In most appli-
cations, it is mandatory for the algorithms to produce the higher perceptual
invisibility, although there are exceptions. One can recall the watermarks in-
troduced in bank notes or legal bills/currency, some of which are perfectly
perceivably at plain sight. For example, every euro bill has a vertical strip
saying “5 Euro”, “10 Euro”, etc. which is visible against the light.
Statistical or algorithmic invisibility
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This kind of invisibility refers to the degree at which hidden information is
invisible to statistical or algorithmic analysis. For example, lets say that, if
we keep every least significant bit of every byte of a given image, the X% of
those bits will be 1’s and the (and therefore the 100−X% will be 0’s) with
a standard deviation of δX%; if analyzing another given image, we obtain a
total of bits to 1 greater than X + 2δX%, one can suspect consequently that
the last image may be carrying hidden information.
Robustness
We will refere here with robustness to the resistance to “innocent” manip-
ulation of an image, audio, etc. carrying hidden information. For example,
resistance to compression, to filters, etc. that an innocent third person may
apply without knowing/supsecting the existance of the hidden information,
and therefore not intending to delete it.
Security
The security of an information hiding technique will correspond to the ro-
bustness to deliberated attacks. One can see it like the security for cryp-
tographic methods. It measures the degree of difficulty/ease of deletion or
extraction of the hidden information, for an attacker who believes there is
hidden information but does not have the stego-key at his disposal.
Capacity
Measures the amount of hidden information that can be hidden compared
to the amount of carrier information, always without breaking any other
requirement (invisibility, robustness...). In audio, it is common to use as
measure the rate of hidden bits per second.
Way of detection
There are two main of its way of detection: those which present blind de-
tection and those which present informed detection, depending on whether
the recipient has at his disposal the original carrier (i.e., the object before
hiding the information) for detection. This is commonly used for water-
marks inclusion, given that, as intuition suggests, informed detection dras-
tically reduces the error possibility when determining whether a watermark
is present or not. In the case of blind detection, the only element the re-
cipient will have at his disposal is the key used to embed the information.
If the information shared between the coder (sender) and the decoder (re-
ceiver) is a cryptographic key, in the literature is sometimes considered as
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informed detection and sometimes as blind detections. Here we’ll consider
it blind detection, as the cryptographic keys do not strictly belong to the
information hiding process.
Complexity and computational cost
In some applications, the computational complexity is quite important (it is
always desirable, but not always mandatory), e.g., for applications transmit-
ting music on live and hidding information at the same time. In that cases,
it will be desirable a low complexity or computational cost of information
hidding. Other applications, specially those which does not have real time
requirements, may afford higher computational costs.
3.3 Classification of information hiding techniques
In figure 3.1 is shown a scheme in which different branches are derived from the
main information hiding science. Most of this branches have taken importance
through time.
Figure 3.1: Classification of information hiding techniques ([32]).
By linguistic steganography we understand the steganography whose carrier is
a written text, while the technical steganography is used for any other carrier type,
be it audio, image, video, etc. At the other side, copyright marking techniques are
divided into fragile marking, in which the introduced marks serve as means for de-
tecting when a content has been modified and does not fulfill certain requirements
it should it it were original. Therefore fragile marking techniques are expected to
introduce easily removable but yet imperceptible marks. Robust marking, at the
contrary, tries to introduced secure marks (difficult to remove even for intentional
attacks). Fingerprinting techniques hide serial numbers to allow, for example, the
identification of the source of an illegal copies chain. Watermarking techniques
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introduce the so called watermarks as copyrights, to allow the identification of the
legitimate author of a given information. Watermarks can either be perceptible or
imperceptible, but must be secure and robust. Lastly, the establishment of hidden
channels and anonimity branches have a self explanatory name.
Focusing in the more extense branches, steganography and robust marking tech-
niques, we can compare in more detail the requirements each one has, being de-
rived from the pursued objectives. We shall first remember their objectives: in
case of marking techniques, the purpose is to introduce certain information that
can be later recovered (or at least to tell whether the information is present or
not) into the stego-object, with the aim of proving the authorsip of the original
information; the objective of steganography is the mere fact of transmitting in-
formation in a hidden manner, whithout any additional objective, just information
transmission. The degree in which each of the characteristics seen in section 3.2
will be what dictaminates how necessary each characteristic is for each branch.
We’ll see them now in the order exposed above:
Perceptual invisibility
For marking, perceptual invisibility is desirable, although it is not always a re-
quirement. We shall recall, e.g., legal bills/currency. In case of marks introduced
in audio tracks, images, etc., although it is not always needed for them to be com-
pletely invisible perceputally speaking, it is usualy a requirement for them not to
be annoying. This is the reason for perceptual invisibility to be quite desirable for
marking techniques.
But, if when speaking of steganography, it is one of the main requirements, as
if there exists the very slightly fact that betrays the presence of the hidden infor-
mation, and that suspicion for negligible it may seem, leads to the information
detection, the very main objective of the steganography will have been defeated.
Statistical or algorithmic invisibility
For marking, the same concepts as before can be applied here. But one can be
slightly thorougher here because statistical or algorithmic visibility can contribute
more information about how a given mark could be erased.
In steganography, statistical or algorithmic invisibility is as crucial as percep-
tual invisibility, for the same reasons explained above, as a perceptually ineficient
technique will betray steganography’s purposes, statistical or algorithmic traces
will also spoil them.
Robustness
As the name suggests, robust marking techniques are pretended to produced
hardly erasable or modifiable marks, therefore, those methods must give a high
attention to the robustness their carriers can be subject to in daily situations (com-
pression, filtering, etc.).
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On the other hand, steganographic techniques does not have this requirement,
as an unintentioned attack implies that the “attacker” is not aware of the existence
of the hidden information, and the hidden information loss does not imply (at
least computationally speaking) more cost than resending the information, while
in case of robust marking it may imply a high economic loss. But despite it is not
a requirement, it is of course, desirable.
Security
For marking techniques, as they requiere robustness, it is logical for them to re-
quire a high level of security: we shall remember that security is basically robust-
ness against intentional attacks, which are the main challenge that watermarking
have to face (think of pirates trying to remove copyright watermarks).
As for steganography, it is also desirable. Suppose the case in which an attacker
believes that a given media hides information. He could only be sure if he is able
to recover it by means of an intentional attack. Therefore, if the steganographic
scheme is secure, an he can’t recover the information, he could never be 100% sure
that the suspicion aroused is just due to an anomaly or, indeed, to the presence of
hidden information.
Capacity
Obviously, as greater the amount of information that can be hided, the better,
but usually marking techniques do not require to hide a lot of information, so
it may be preferable to obtain lower capacity while being able to improve other
characteristics, as robustness or security.
In steganography, on the other hand, achieving a high hiding capacity is quite
important, as the main purpose is the very transmission of information.
Way of detection
For marking techniques, more than a necessary or not necessary characteris-
tic, the way of detection offers different alternatives to implementation, therefore,
there can be marking techniques that make use of blind detection and marking
techniques that make use of informed detection, choosing one of them depending
on the context.
Steganography will always use blind detection. Note that informed detection
requires the original carrier to be known both by the sender and the receiver, and
this won’t be possible for many cases.
Complexity and computational cost
Logically, the lesser the complexity of the algorithm, the better. But in this
case, the level of complexity will be given by the concrete situation. Normally,
in marking techniques this is not a very important characteristic, as there are no
strict real time requirements.
For steganographic techniques, it will also depend on the context, although the
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use of steganography for real time information transmission (with audio, video,
etc.) is more common. Nevertheless, if the transmission does not take place in
real time, the sender can use as much time as needed, so this requirement will not
be so important.
As completion, we can deduce that depending on the objectives, we will be
forced to sacrifice certain characteristics in favour of the others. Basically, these
needs can be summarized in three: invisibility, robustness and capacity, creating
a triangle in which, if a vertex is moved away, other must be brought closer (see
[10], page 52).
Chapter 4
Steganographic and steganalitic
methods
So, we have steganography, which is an information hiding branch that aims rel-
atively high capacities, high invisibility and low robustness. As we have seen,
the media over which the steganography is to be applied, has to be studied care-
fully, to reach the desired objectives and be able to choose the more adequate
steganographic methods. Even with that metodology, developing an stegano-
graphic method is a delicate task. It is not enough with taking care at designing
time. For a steganographic method to be considered effective in terms of capacity,
invisibility and robustness, it has to be subject to the experts scrutiny, and deep
statistical and perceptual analysis. Just designing a steganographic method and
claiming it is invincible or undetectable without following the mentioned steps, as
for every security application, is like a “show for the gallery”.
Being that said, and given that in the part addressed to the study of the basic
acoustic principles, we have now the task of studying the different steganographic
algorithms existing nowadays. We will also classify them depending on the tech-
niques they make use of. Although we will focus in the next part into audio, we
will also see steganographic techniques applied over other media (mainly image,
although some text algorithms will also be seen), as we can extract very useful
knowledge from them. In the same manner, it will quite ingenuous designing a
steganographic method without knowing the existing steganalytic counterpart (at
least the very basic), to at least try to defeat them.
As steganographic techniques require a high level of knowledge of the stegano-
graphic techniques they pretend to detect, identify and break, we’ll first center our
attention into steganographic techniques, and afterwards, once known the most
important algorithms, we will focus in steganalytic methods that let us detect
and/or cancel the studied steganographic methods.
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4.1 Classification of steganographic methods
Steganographic algorithms can be classified in several ways: depending on the
carrier type (images, audio, video, or text, mainly); the very algorithm type (LSB
hiding, statistical variations, order permutations, etc.); in terms of the degree of
capacity, robustness or invisibility achieved; or the objective pursued.
In chapter 3.2 of [24] it is presented a classification of steganographic algo-
rithms depending on the techniques used to establish the subliminal channel. We
will follow here a similar approach, extending it in some places and suggesting
carrier formats at which a given method can be applied. We won’t take into ac-
count here the algorithms that “hide” information in places which do not strictly
compose the carrier, i.e. the methods that hide the “subliminal information” in
reserved fields or without use, in headers or files’ structures, appending it at the
end of a file, etc., as the detection of stego-objects produced by these means is
trivial.
4.1.1 Color palette modification (image)
Palette base images (mainly BMP and GIF), are composed by a set of concrete
colors. Each one of these colors is assigned a vector, representing the value of the
color, and an index, creating in this way a palette. In the different image positions
the index to the color in the palette corresponding to the value of the pixel to
represent will be used, instead of the value itself. Therefore, to hide information
in images of this kind, what one can do is to modify the color values stored in the
palette (using, e.g., some technique as LSB substitution), or changing the way of
ordering the colors of the palette, given that, having a N colors size of palette,
there will be N ! different orderings, being this an important size even for a little
number of colors; one can also choose to modify the image itself, but in this
case special care has to be taken, because near indexes do not imply perceptually
similar colors. Therefore, a rearrangement of the palette in such a manner that
colors are grouped by perceptual resemblance.
A more elaborated algorithm is the proposed in[35], where authors introduce a
high capacity method based in the modification of the color palette for monochrome
images. From the image histogram, they create pairs of the most used colors
(peaks) with the non used colors (zeros), modifying the non used colors depend-
ing on the bits to hide. These pairings can be made in several ways, and the au-
thors analyze them giving the chance to choose the one that produces the highes
capacity.
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4.1.2 Substitution methods
LSB Substitution (image and audio):
There exist different steganographic techniques based in the modification
of the least significant bits, or LSBs, also referred in the literature as low-
bit coding techniques. This kind of methods are based in the modification
of the bits which provide less value to the carrier signal and, for this very
reason, they will be the bits which introduce less error when modified. The
only drawback of this approach is that, precisely due to that fact, they are
the favourite candidates to be modified during a subsequent signal process-
ing, decreasing drastically the robustness of this methods. But, as we have
already said, in this study we prioritize capacity over robustness, and these
techniques produce the highest capacity. Related to imperceptibility, several
strategies can be taken to reduce the effect of the introduced modifications.
In [20], the authors study basic methods of information hiding in LSB. Al-
though they focus in grayscale images, these methods can be directly ap-
plied (or with just little modifications), to almost any kind of format. The
methods studied here are described below:
1. Simple LSB: It consists in hiding x bits of subliminal message into each
image pixel, so modifying the x least significant bits of the original
pixel.
2. Optimal LSB: Similar to the previous one, but after hiding x bits, the
(x − 1)-least significant bit is modified to make the final pixel value
be the nearest to the original one. For example, if the original p0 has
a binary value of 110010012 = 20110 and we want to hide 1112, the
final pixel pf value will be 110011112 = 20710, but, changing the 4th
least significant bit, the final value will be 110001112 = 19910, and
therefore, the absolute value of the introduced distortion is reduced
from 6 to 2 without affecting the subliminal message.
3. Pixel-Value Differencing (PVD) method: This method allows varia-
tions in each pixel’s capacity depending on its predisposition to invis-
ibly hiding information. Pixels forming edges or borders usually offer
more tolerance to distortion than pixels in “interior” regions. This way,
the image is divided in disjoing blocks, being formed each block by
adjacent pixels in the image. The difference of the values between ad-
jacent pixels will be used to determine the subliminal capacity of each
block, being higher as higher is the difference (this difference is used
as an estimator to border areas).
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4. Multiple-Based Notational System (MBNS): With a similar concept as
the one used in PVD, this method is based in the Human Visual System
to dtermine the subliminal capacity of each pixel in the original image.
This capacity will increase if the local variation of the pixel values of
the area embracing a given pixel is high. This variation is calculated
from the three adjacent pixels to each given pixel, being therefore the
estimated of the final pixel capacity more accurate than the estimation
produced in the previous method, which only takes into account one
single adjacent pixel.
In any case, although PVD and MBNS methods produce final results in
which the subliminal information is imperceptible, given that they keep bet-
ter the original image characteristics, they also have less subliminal capacity
than Simple LSB or Optimal LSB, which, in change of less image quality
(maybe putting into risk the paramount objective of steganography, being
imperceptible) offer a higher hiding capacity. An special case of LSB mod-
ification, which is included as a different algorithm type in [24] is what they
call image degradation. This method is based in decreasing the quality of
two images of the same dimensions (one of them being the carrier image
and the other, the subliminal image), using roughly the half of the bits to
represent each pixel. Once done so, substituting the least significant half
of the carrier image pixels by the most significant half of the pixels of the
subliminal image, the latter can be transmitted in a hidden manner. Quite
often, the visual distortion so produced passes unnoticed.
Block parity (image and audio):
Another substitution method is based in dividing the carrier (an image or an
audio track) into blocks or segments of a given size. Establishing an arbi-
trary ordering of the resulting blocks, each block’s parity will be obtained
and, if the parity of block bi matches the i-th bit of the subliminal message,
nothing needs to be done; if they don’t match, the least significant bit of
one of the block’s elements will be flipped. The receiver will just have to
calculate the parity of the blocks, obviously using the same ordering than
the sender used.
Codebooks modification (image and audio):
In [9] the authors propose a method for information hiding in uncompressed
audio (WAV). The method was proposed in 2001 and it is very elaborated,
as it takes into account the psychoacoustic characteristic of the Human Au-
ditory System. The proposal consists in using the short term Fourier Trans-
form and the Wavelet transform, which are fed with the original acoustic
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signal. The Wavelet transform is a special Fourier transform, with variable
window length among other properties, which distinguish it from the nor-
mal FFT, and make it more adequate for obtaining a good decomposition in
frequency bands similar to the decomposition obtained by the Human Au-
ditory System. The short term Fourier Transform, allows the estimation of
the signal’s tonal components, from which a masking curve can be deduced,
and therefore a maximum noise quantity that the sound wave could stand.
The data to hide will be used as an index to choose the quantifier that will be
employed to quantize the signal obtained with the Wavelet transform. The
way of proceeding is as follows: the available codes for quantizing the sig-
nal are organized in a binary tree structure (4.1), and each data chain to hide
will be used to choose between 0 branch or 1 branch in each tree’s node,
until reaching a leaf, which will contain the concrete code to use. By means
of a perceptual mask obtained from the short term Fourier Transform, it
will be determined if the introduced noise is acceptable. The receiver will
estimate the code used by choosing the word with the least distance to the
received vector, recovering the hidden information by going through the
same path as the sender went throuhg the binary tree for encoding, from the
corresponding leaf, to the root.
Figure 4.1: Binary tree codebook used in ([9]).
Given a δ distance between the odebook’s words, the amount of noise that
the algorithm can stand can be determined, and therefore, the probability of
an unrecoverable error during decoding can be estimated, given the channel
characteristics. It is important to note that these algorithms are designed for
Additive White Gaussian Noise channels, although they can be extended to
follow other noise probabilistic models. Although the authors of the article
limit their study to audio signals, the method can also be applied to im-
age, taking into account the Human Visual System insted the auditory, and
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probably, adapting the codes or codebooks to a more suited ones.
4.1.3 Hiding in transformed domain (image and audio)
Frequency coefficients modification:
The methods acting in time domain are not usually very robust, reaching the
point of loosing all the hidden information if the stego-object is processed
by means of some basic technique of signals processing. On the contrary,
methods including subliminal information in frequency domain are usually
more robust. This is due that the regions less prone to be subject to im-
portant modifications can be choosen more wisely, and, at the same time,
introduce the modification in a less noticeable way. Normally, this implies
variations in the middle area of the spectrum (at least, for audio).
A method exposed in [24] consists in dividing the signal in blocks, and for
each block, choose two elements (frequency coefficients) a and b which
have near values. If the element with a greater value is a, the block will
code, say, a 0, and if b is greater than a, then the block will code a 1. Ob-
viously, to transmit the desired subliminal message, the a and b values will
be modified for hiding the corresponding bit. The receiver, of course, will
have to use the same segments partition, the same ordering, and the same
elements inside segment, to be able to recover the subliminal information.
Phase coding (audio)
This type of techniques are solely applicable to acoustic signal due to the in-
sensibility of the Human Auditory System to absolute changes in the signals
phase [31]. A good and quick introduction to this methods can be found in
[3]. They basically work by introducing slight modifications in the original
signal’s phase, divided in segments. The phase of each segment is modified
accordingly to the corresponding bit of subliminal message, also adapting
the phase of the subsequent segments as needed, to minimize the relative
changes between the phase of adjacent segments. The higher the intro-
duced modification is, the higher will be the method’s robustness, but lesser
will be its invisibility. Similarly, te shorter the segments are, the higher the
capacity will be, but also diminishing its invisibility.
Echo insertion (audio)
This method is also applicable only to acoustic signals, due to the Human
Auditory System properties. If, given an acoustic signal, a second signal
of the same type (same frequency components) is introduced at an instant t
slightly delayed and with less amplitude a, for the right t and a, the resulting
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echo will be imperceptible for an average human ear. Depending on if one
wants to hide a 1 or a 0, a distinct t will be used (previously specified,
obviously) and, in the same manner as for phase coding methods, the signal
will be divided in segments, applying the corresponding echo to each one of
them, given the subliminal bits. Also like for phase coding, the shorter the
segments, the higher the capacity but the lesser the imperceptibility. More
details on this methods can be found in [3].
4.1.4 Spread spectrum (image and audio)
The spread spectrum techniques, based in the theory of the same name, widely
used in telecommunications (see [29]), deserve a special mention. They are tra-
ditionally used as watermarking methods, and therefore, almost all of them offer
high robustness and low subliminal capacity, and even sometimes they do not
care much about imperceptibility, given that they are normally used as intellectual
properties marks. These methods can also be adapted to provide a relatively high
subliminal capacity at the cost of diminishing the robustness, and, therefore, they
can also be used as steganographic methods. In [2], Bassia et al. propose a mark-
ing method in time domain for acoustic signals. The original signal is divided in
segments of length N , and the watermark, also of length N is generated using a
chaotic map to ensure that an attacker who knows part of the watermark won’t
be able to recover it by means of inverse engineering, as knowing the complete
watermark will ease the process of deleting it. Once generated, the original wa-
termark is subject to a Hamming low-pass filter to limit the produced distortion.
Finally, the sender inserts the watermark in each signal’s segment, using a func-
tion that can be either additive or multiplicative. The receiver, who knows the
watermark he is looking for, statistically estimates its pressence from the average
of the received signal multiplied by the watermark (see the original article for a
detailed demonstration). The authors claim that the method is robust to mp2 and
mp3 compression, filtering, resampling, requantization and cropping, given that
the modifications that should be introduced to reduce the detection rate should be
very aggressive an that will notably diminish the signal quality.
In [37], within the First International Workshop of Information Hiding, Smith
and Comiskey propose a method of information hiding also based in Spread Spec-
trum techniques. The authors analyze three variants, all of them based in the de-
sign of a set of base functions, orthogonal between them, which will be used to
modulate, depending on the subliminal message bits, the pixels of an image. Be-
ing the functions orthogonal guarantees that the hidden bits, modulated by these
functions will not interfere between them, giving the receiver the possibility of
decoding them without problem. But that won’t happen with the external noise
introduced naturally or by an attacker. The techniques derived from this, usually
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contribute a high robustness to attacks or noise in the channel, as the receiver
recovers the embeded subliminal bits from statistical estimations, based, given
the concrete method, in different properties of the received signal. In [26], it is
proposed a method for hiding watermarks in text images (scanned text, pdf files,
etc.). Initially, the size of the most frequent character is found in the text. To
do so, beginning with blocks of a given size, the entropy (changes between black
and white pixels) between adjacent blocks is analyzed, increasing the block size
until sharp horizontal changes are found (these will be changes of words) and
vertically (changes of lines) to estimate the font size used in the block. Once esti-
mated the most frequent block size, the blocks containing characters of the most
frequent size will be used to hide the information, as this areas will be the ones
which less perceptual impact will have, once modified. To hide the information,
the characters are expanded (using individual black pixels) until giving the block
the adequated parity, determined by the subliminal bit to hide in the block. At the
receiver’s side, he will have to repeat the process to obtain the size of the most
frequent character and recover the subliminal information, in the shape of blocks
parities, to finally recover the message. This technique is well suited for intro-
ducing watermarks in text, as its subliminal capacity is low but it can be a robust
method.
In [28], Malvar and Floreˆncio realize a detailed study of the properties of water-
marking techniques based in Spread Spectrum, developing a new method, which
they called Improved Spread Spectrum. From a similar scheme to that studied
in [2], although without restricting its application to time domain, they propose
a new mode of insertion of the watermark that is more elaborated than a simple
additive or multiplicative function, letting therefore the possibility of using any
function to mix the watermark with the original signal. Using a linear function as
a simple approximation for the sake of analysis ease, marked signals are obtained
in which the distortion, error rate, and robustness reach the same level as with tra-
ditional Spread Spectrum techniques, and even better. Moreover, on one side and
by means of the introduction of two parameters, α and λ, for which the optimal
values are deduced, the energy of the watermark and the distortion introduced can
be controlled, and on the other side, using a window of modification of the signal,
the levels of distortion, error rate and robustness are easily configurable depending
on the desired objective.
Seen these Spread Spectrum based techniques, which let us have a good idea of
the families of methods of this kind, we mention again that they are normally used
to obtain high robustness and low capacity. Nevertheless, the majority of them (if
not all) are based in a partition of the carrier signal in blocks of arbirtrary size,
over which statistical modifications are made to hide the information. The bigger
the size of these blocks, the more statistical evidence it will be of the hidden bit
and the higher the robustness will be (although not to certain attacks); if, on the
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contrary, the block size is reduced, the statistical evidence will be less, may be
giving place to uncertainty to some bocks, but at the same time, there will be a
greater number of blocks, and therefore a greater number of subliminal bits, in-
creasing the capacity. This is the reason why it can happen that a Spread Spectrum
based technique may be used as with a steganographic end.
4.1.5 Statistical steganography (image and audio)
These methods usually offer low subliminal capacity, but with a high robustness,
something that may go against steganographic principles, but, in the same way as
with Spread Spectrum, they can be adapted to offer higher capacity an less robust-
ness. The Patchwork method, presented in [3] belongs to this kind of methods.
In it, an image is divided into blocks, and each block again in two sets A and B.
For example, to hide a 1 in a given block, the brightness of the pixels in A will
be increased in a given quantity δ, and the brightness of the pixels in B will be
decreased in the same quantity; to hide a 0, the changes will be in the opposite
direction. The receiver, using the same block division and blocks’ sets, will com-
pute the value of the difference between them. A positive difference will mean 1
and a negative difference will mean 0. This method is based in that, statistically,
the expected brightness difference between two pixels is 0, and therefore, if after
analyzing this difference for several pixels pairs (obviously, the more, the better)
a positive or negative value far from 0 is recovered, this will indicate the pres-
ence of a hidden bit. Of course, the grater δ is, the greater the evidence will also
be and less communication errors will take place. Dividing the original signal in
smaller blocks will increase the capacity. This method is applied to images, al-
though it probably could be adapted to acoustic signal, using the Human Auditory
System properties to find a “brightness equivalent” (which might be, for example,
loudness).
4.1.6 Steganography over text
Steganography over text is specially delicated, as almost any change could arouse
suspicion, and for methods introducing less perceptible changes, the achieved ca-
pacity is very low. Also, for steganography over image or audio is mainly based
in mainpulation and processing of the signals, while steganography over text does
not have much in common with them. It is important to emphasize that with text
we are referring here to pure text, not scanned and stored in an image. As we saw
in the previous subsection, scanned text or text stored as an image can be treated
just like any other image, with a little more of restrictions, but like an image in the
end.
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Steganography over text methods can be classified in three kinds: blanks in-
sertion, syntactic methods and semantic methods. The blanks insertion methods
consist in inserting white spaces, between words an between lines, and line breaks,
to introduce subliminal bits. The advantage of this approach is that blanks usually
pass unperceived, but they have a very low robustness, and any text editor can
modify them without even being aware of their presence, just by opening the text
file. Syntactic methods consist in changing punctuation marks or slightly altering
the order of some sentences, e.g. changing “The big black cloud” for “The black
big cloud”. Lastly, semantic methods use synonyms to code subliminal informa-
tion, for example, “big” and “large” may both be used with the same meaning,
and by assigning a 0 to “big” and a 1 to “large” we could hide some subliminal
information each time each word is used without arousing any suspicion. [3] can
be consulted for more information. A similar method is the one used in Hydan
([12]), which hides subliminal information changing machine code instructions
by equivalent instructions, e.g., add $eax, $50 ≡ sub $eax,−$50.
Yet another steganographic method, a little different of the previous ones, but
also over text, consists in the autogeneration of the very carrier text from a sub-
liminal message to hide, using a set of grammar rules as generator, jointly with a
dictionary of words to create texts that seem real. The problem of this method is
that it creates very long texts with little subliminal information, although, as we
already know, this is a common characteristic for steganography over text.
4.2 Steganalytic algorithms
As in steganography, in steganalysis the existing algorithms and methods can be
classified in several ways: depending on their objectives, their strategies, the tar-
geted steganographic methods, the carrier formats supported, if they are active
(i.e., they introduce changes in the stego-object) or passive (they just analyze the
stego-object), etc. In this section we’ll se two different classifications and the most
relevant steganalytic methods.
4.2.1 Classification of steganalyitic altorighms
Classification depending on the known information In cryptography, the crypt-
analytic techniques are classified depending on the information available or
known to the cryptanalyst in terms of ciphered and plain messages. Fol-
lowing the same idea, in steganography, the steganalytic techniques can be
classified depending on the information available to the steganalyst. Nev-
ertheless, there are certain differences with respect to the cryptanalyst ap-
proach ([24]):
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• Stego only attack: The steganalyst knows only the stego-object.
• Known cover attack: The steganalyst knows the original carrier and
the final stego-object.
• Known message attack: The steganalyst has at his disposal the hidden
message and the stego-object. Despite knowing the hidden message,
the complexity of this attack is similar to a stego-only attack.
• Chosen stego attack: The steganalyst knows the final stego-object and
the steganographic algorithm used.
• Chosen message attack: The steganalyst generates a stego-object from
a message chosen by himself.
• Known stego attack: The steganographic algorithm, the original car-
rier and the final stego-object are known to the attacker.
Classification depending on the desired goal Although the main goal of steganog-
raphy is to transmit information which passes completely unperceived, an
attacker may have several different intentions regarding the hidden informa-
tion. He may want to analyze a stego-object to determine if it carries hidden
information. He may want also to recover the hidden information, the stego-
key, or both. And he may want to thwart the subliminal communication, in
case it exists. The two first cases belong to the passive steganalysis attacks
while the last is called active steganalysis, because they do not modify, or
do modify, respectively, the original stego-object.
4.2.2 Universal methods (blind steganalysis)
Universal steganalysis, strictly said, does not exist. Id est, there is no stegana-
lytic method that works for every steganographic method without false positives
or false negatives. Nevertheless, there are methods that are applied over “stegano-
graphic families”, i.e., steganographic methods which are based on the same prin-
ciples (for instance, LSB-like methods). Some of them can be applied directly,
while others have to be configured previously. Their strategies will depend, obvi-
ously, on the desired goal. In [7] the steganalytic methods are classified depending
on their strategies in for different groups:
• Supervised learning based steganalysis : its objective is to differentiate be-
tween objects that carry hidden information from objects that don’t. They
can be based in existing automatic learning methods (neuronal networks,
decission trees, etc.). Among their advantages, we can highlight that, using
an adequate training set, they can be good universal classifiers, suitable for
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any steganographic method, and they do not assume any statistical property
of the stego-objects. Between their disadvantages, the most important are
that different training sets must be used depending on the type of stegano-
graphic algorithm to be detected1, it can be difficult to ascertain the most de-
terminant characteristics that make possible the stego-object classification,
and, as for many learning methods, it will always depend, in the end, on the
steganalyst and his experience on the field. The false positive/negative rates
are not directly controlled by the steganalyist.
• Blind identification based steganalysis : this type of methods do not asusme
anything concerning the steganographic algorithm used, and are based just
in the statistical properties of the carrier under analysis. This may be an
advantage in the sense that the results may be more precise, as they are not
based upon a measure obtained by means of a training or analysis of a subset
of objects. Moreover, they may not be limited solely to hidden information
detection, but also to its extraction. In [6], Chandramouli proposes and an-
alyzes a framework for linear hiding algorithms for images (like the typical
Spread Spectrum), reducing the problem to an estimation of the inverse of
the transformation matrix used during the hidding process. It requires at
least that the same stego-key has been used in two different stego-objects
and the so obtained matrix has maximum range and either the transformed
coefficients of the carrier image, or the subliminal bits, follow a Gaussian
distribution. If these conditions hold, he produces an estimation of the sub-
liminal message. In this example, classic among this kind of methods, we
can observe that the assumptions taken over the statistical models and the
requirements for applying the method, may suppose serious drawbacks for
these methods.
• Parametric statistical detection based steganalysis : from the information
available to the attacker at a first instance (algorithm used, carrier object,
stego-object, subliminal message) or assuming that the attacker has at his
disposal probabilistic methods to estimate the unknown “configuration op-
tions”, some parameters are deduced to attack steganographic algorithms.
These methods are not limited to specific algorithms, and they can deduce
or even determine a maximum error rate. They can also be implemented
to make available the detection of subliminal information presence, to re-
cover the hidden message, or even the stego-key. On the other hand, the
estimation of the needed parameters for steganalysis drastically determines
the effectiveness of the method. Also, wrong assumptions over the value
1One can therefore think that this approach, rather than solving the universality problem, trans-
fers it to the training sets
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of the statistical models or any other parameter can lead inexorably to poor
results.
• Hybrid techniques : as the very name indicates, these techniques are com-
binations of the techniques explained before. Therefore, depending on the
specific combinations, the advantages and disadvantages will be those of
their components.
4.2.3 Visual steganalysis
Visual steganalysis methods consist on trying to identify at plain sight suspicious
parts of an image (its equivalent in audio would be auditory steganalysis). This can
be made without previous modification to the image or audio under analysis. But,
in this case, the attack would have very little oportunities to be successful against
any serious steganographic method: we have to recall that steganography’s main
purpose is to be unperceivable at plain sight. Nevertheless, somehow processing
the stego-object and carrying out a visual steganalysis over the obtained image,
surprising results can be achieved. In [45], Westfeld and Pfitzmann steganalyze
successfully several applications (EzStego, S-Tools, Steganos and JSteg) using
this method. The general schema is shown in figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Schema of visual steganalysis ([45]).
The authors of the methods mentioned above, similarly to other authors, based
their hiding methods in the assumption that the least significant bits of the im-
age pixels follow a random distribution. Westfeld and Pfitzmann, claimed that
assumption to be false, and developed the visual steganalysis method. For the
former assumption to be true, there would not be any perceivable difference at
plain sight after substituting the LSBs by random bits, centering our attention to
the least significant bit level. Nevertheless, the result obtained by Westfeld and
Pfitzmann does not leave any place to doubts, as can be observed in figure 4.3,
also extracted from [45].
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Figure 4.3: Result of visual steganalysis over EzStego. At the left, the stego-
image after using its first half to hide information using EzStego. At the right, the
stego-image’s least significant bit level ([45]).
4.2.4 Specific steganalytic methods
With specific steganalytic methods one may refer to steganalytic methods that
may be applied over a family of steganographic applications, i.e., methods which
apply the same principle to hide information. Also, one may refer to steganalytic
methods suitable only for one specific steganographic algorithm. As we will see
in the subsequent sections, the former are based in analyzing statistical properties
of the transmitted signal, focusing on concrete properties. The latter are based in
certain patterns that can be linked to a concrete application.
Chi-square steganalysis
This kind of attacks are suitable to images that have been subject to stegano-
graphic algorithms of LSB type. In [45] and [17], the statistical effectos of
these kind of steganography are studied. The Pairs of Values are the pixel
values that differ only in their least significant bit, conforming, therefore
groups of pairs of values. Being modified just the least significant bit ac-
cordingly to the subliminal message, if a given pixel belongs to the pi pair,
it will remain at pair pi after the flipping. This way, if, e.g., the subliminal
message bits follow a uniform distribution (typical for ciphered data), after
hiding them, one can expect the frequencies of each pair of values’ elements
to be approximately equal. If they follow another distribution, then the ex-
pected frequencies will be modified acording to that distribution. Contrast-
ing the observed frequencies with the expected ones, using a Chi-square
test, we can obtain statistical evidence pointing to the presence of sublimi-
nal data. Moreover, if the message has been embeded sequentialy, a drastic
decrease of the obtained p-value will be ovserved (si figure 4.4, extracted
from [45]). This type of attacks are known as Chi-square steganalysis or
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PoV steganalysis.
Figure 4.4: Sample of probability of subliminal data calculation with the PoV
method ([45]).
Nevertheless, there are methods that avoid this attack by keeping the first
order statistics of the carrier image. Id est, the colour histogram of the car-
rier image remains intact, or at least keeps a similar probability distribution.
These kind of steganographic methods are known as Preserved Statistical
Properties or PSP methods. They usually extend the classic LSB algorithms
in two ways. First, the image areas possessing statistical properties that may
“betray” the hidden information if modified. Second, they alter the sublimi-
nal message bits in order to adopt the same probability distribution than the
bits to be substituted (the LSBs). Nevertheless, in [5], Bo¨hme and Westfeld
study these methods, developing an attack, which may be considered as an
evolution of the explained above, based in high order statistics. That is,
although PSP methods preserve first order statistics (i.e., histograms), they
do not keep relations between what Bo¨hme and Westfeld call dependence
groups, which are partitions of the colours by their value. For instance, a
partition in colours differing only in their LSB. The studied relations are
the number of times a colour appears with respect to another, based in that,
similar colours are more likely to happen in near locations. This counting
is stored and represented in co-occurrence matrices and contingency tables,
used to perform statistical tests like Chi-square goodness of fit. If the num-
ber of passed tests is lesser than a predefined limit, the image is considered
to carry subliminal information, hidden with a PSP method.
RS method
In [17], Fridrich and Goljan propose the method known as RS, for ste-
ganalyzing images with subliminal messages hidden in their LSBs. The
subjacent idea is based in using a function f that somehow measures the
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smoothness of the changes among pixels (the lower the value, the smoother
the changes among them, or the lesser the noise of the image). This value
will increase when modifying the LSB of each image pixel when they are
modified pseudorandomly, given that, statistically, the differences among
adjacent pixels, will increase. The name of the method derives form what
the authors call R, or Regular, and S, or Singular, blocks. Regular blocks
are those where the value of f is increased after randomization, and Sin-
gular blocks are those in which the value of f decreases (one can imagine
that the name regular comes from the fact that what is happening is what it
is expected, while singular comes from not being expected). What should
be expected is, for images that have not being subject to steganography, the
number of pixel blocks of R type subject to a positive increase would be ap-
proximately equal to those experiencing a negative increase. And the same
for S blocks. In images with hidden information, the authors observe that
the difference between R blocks with positive and negative modifications is
increased, while the difference between S blocks with positive and negative
modifications is decreased. From the size of this modifications, an approx-
imate length of the subliminal message can also be deduced. Nevertheless,
this method is less effective when the image under analysis is too noisy.
Also, as we have already seen for other methods, if the subliminal bits do
not follow a random distribution, the method is not suitable, also this could
be amended if the subliminal bits distribution is known.
Methods based in transformation function properties Also in [17], it is ex-
posed the possibility of detecting the pressence of subliminal data by ana-
lyzing the compatibility of the pixels/coefficient values of the image with
the methods used for space-frequency transformation. Specifically, the pa-
per refers to the JPEG format, which uses the Discrete Cosine Transforma-
tion, or DCT, for this purpose. Even after decompressing a JPEG image,
there are evidence that the image has been subject to JPEG compression.
This is due to the fact that the values a pixel can take are limited. Therefore,
if the pixels are modified to shelter hidden information, the incompatibility
with the JPEG format will increase. In the mentioned paper, the authors
present an algorithm for measuring, by blocks, the degree of incompati-
bility of the image with the JPEG format. As a consequence, this type of
steganalysis can detect the presence of subliminal messages in JPEG im-
ages. Probably, this method could also be exporte to other type of carriers
(like compressed audio, for instance) and other type of transform functions.
Methods based on fingerprints detection
This type of methods are based on the detection of identifiable patterns that
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are known to be produced by specific steganographic methods. For exam-
ple, the steganographic program Mandelsteg, creates GIF images with 256
entries in the color index, presenting a detectable pattern of 128 unique
colours with 2 entries per colour in the palette. This type of attacks re-
quire studying in depth each steganographic method, and are not exportable
to different algorithms. Some methods, although they could be considered
more forensic than steganographic, deserve to be named. There are applica-
tions that look for traces of known steganographic applications installed in
a computer. They use stored hash values of their executables and searching
them in the hard drive, memory, or looking for certain entries in the Win-
dows registry that indicate that sometime, a given application was installed.
4.3 Conclusions about the state of the art
Having studied the main steganographic and steganalytic algorithms, we can make
a main conclusion: nowadays, there exist no universal steganographic method
with a success of 100%, but it does not exist either an steganalytic method for
detecting every existing stegahographic algorithm. On the “hiding” side, a triple
tradeoff takes place, having to decide between robustness, capacity and imper-
ceptibility. This is why, depending on the situation, one should sacrifice one for
the sake of the other. For steganography itself, it is usually more desirable to ob-
tain a high capacity and imperceptibility, reducing the importance of robustness.
Nevertheless, although we can almost forget robustness, we still have to play with
capacity and imperceptibility. Increasing the imperceprtibility, we strengthen the
main purpose of steganography, which is to be undetectable, but the amount of
transmitted information might not be enough.
As for the “detection” side, the more general the method applied is, the lesser
its effectiveness. Therefore, if we want to obtain a higher success rate, we should
resort to specific methods. But this has the disadvantage of making necessary
to use a different method for each steganographic family and/or carrier format,
increasing the system complexity. Nevertheless, it seems that any existing method,
although being centered in concrete steganographic algorithms, offers a perfect
success rate.
To confirm this conclusions, it suffices to see that steganography and steganaly-
sis are sciences relatively young, at least applied to the digital world, and are areas
in constant evolution. Each year new steganographic methods, defeating previous
steganalytic algorithms are presented, but some time later, new steganalytic algo-
rithms detecting those new steganographic methods are discovered.
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Part III
Proposed system
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In the preceeding parts, we have studied the theoretic basics of signal process-
ing, necessary to understand the guts of the steganographic algorithms, studying
also the main steganographic techinques. Now that we have a good general idea
of all what is needed to create a steganographic method, knowing also the stegan-
alytic counterpart, we can stablish some guidelines.
In this part, we will present first the proposed steganographic method from an
algorithmic perspective, specifying the methods in which it is based and the mea-
sures taken to control in an effective way the magnitude of the introduced varia-
tions. Once understood the method itself, we will give a more technique descrip-
tion of the system. Nevertheless, the implementation given here is just a mean that
will let us make a first analysis of the quality achieved by our method. As we said,
proposing a method, without even analyzing it a little for later improvements, is
quite “brave”. Therefore, even that the implementation has been a hard part of
this work, we won’t center our attention in it.
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Chapter 5
Steganographic method
The first question we have to ask is: Where are we going to put the subliminal in-
formation?. Recalling how Vrobis works, we have to remark that the floor vector
contains the basic information about the signal being transmitted, while residue
vectors hold the details about it. Therefore, the logic reasoning would be to in-
clude the subliminal information in the residues, as modiying aggressively the
floors would be disastrous. Nevertheless, as we will see in section 5.2.1, we will
manage ourselves to get something out of the little subliminal capacity the floor
vectors provide us.
5.1 Modification of residues
Here we are going to develop a method to determine the maximum variations that
we will introduce in the residue vectors. As we sought in part I, Vorbis’ psychoa-
coustic model has the floor vector as main component. This floor is, grosso modo,
the superposition of the tone and noise masks. It is used as a quantizer, subtracting
it from the frequency coefficients in lograithmic scale (or dividing in linear scale,
which is in fact what Vorbis does). The “remainder” elements are what is called
residues, whose elements are rounded to the nearest integer before being coded,
and also before the coupling, if any. I.e., in each frequency line, each time we
increase or decrease the corresponding residue in one unit, we will be increasing
or decreasing the intensity of the global signal in a value equal to the floor vector,
or, in other words, to the mask value at that frequency. This gives us little space to
play for values near to the mask. In these cases, a simple variation of +1 or −1 in
the corresponding residue, could make us “cross” the auditive threshold delimited
by the mask. So we will have to look for a method that avoids this areas, centering
its efforts where a bigger difference exists between the mask and the global signal.
Once identified the frequencies where the signal is much bigger than the mask, it
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is very important to take also in consideration that it is not the same to increase
x dB in a frequency f1 than making this same increase in another frequency f2,
due to the psychoacoustic properties of the Human Auditory System. In [21] it is
proposed a weighting curve precisely with that purpose. The curve is shown in
5.1, and represents the sensitivity to noise depending on the frequency. It can be
observed that low and high frequencies are less sensitive, while this sensitivity is
increased for medium frequencies, reaching a maximum at approximately 6 kHz.
This weighting curve came up with the intent to solve the problems that A-, B- C-,
and D-weighting curves presented. These curves, mainly used in the US, failed
basically for low frequencies. From the curve in 5.1, maximum tolerances, in dB,
are derived as a function of frequency. These tolerances are shown in figure 5.2
and we will use them as starting poitn for our method. Basically, we will used
the values in the table, obtaining the intermediate values with linear interpolation.
Therefore, what we have to do now is to obtain the maximum increase or decrease
we can apply to the residue in order to obtain an increase or decrese that keeps
the distortion intensity within the limits established in [21]. To do so, we will
distinguish between positive and negative residues, given that a residue r+ > 0
being incremented by a value x > 0 will result in an increase of dB taking as
reference the value r+. In the other case, increasing a residue r− < 0 in a value
x > 0 taking as reference r− will result in a lesser dB value although we are in
fact increasing it. This is due to the fact that we are taking as base reference a
negative value with absolute value bigger than the resulting value. Once made
this observation, the maximum allowed variation for the residues will be obtained
as shown in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for obtaining the maximum allowed variations in residues
.
1: if residuei > 0 then
2: max increase = residuei ∗ (10ITU468i/10 − 1)
3: max decrease = residuei ∗ (10−ITU468i/10 − 1)
4: else
5: max increase = residuei ∗ (10−ITU468i/10 − 1)
6: max decrease = residuei ∗ (10ITU468i/10 − 1)
7: end if
Where residuei refers to the residue value for the i-th bin of the used transform
(in our case, the MDCT), and ITU468i refers to the tolerance, in dB, of the figure
5.2 for the frequency corresponding to that i-th bin.
Formulas at lines 2 and 3 are demonstrated below.
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10 log (
(R + x)F
RF
) = ITU468i
log (
(R + x)
R
) = ITU468i/10
R + x
R
= 10ITU468i/10
R + x = R ∗ 10ITU468i/10
x = R(10ITU468i/10 − 1)
(5.1)
Taking the positive value of ITU468 for increments in the intensity, and the neg-
ative value for decrements. For the formulas at the lines 5 and 6, the demonstration
the same, but taking the negative value of ITU468 for decrements in the intensity
and the positive value for increments.
Figure 5.1: Response curve in the weighting at [21].
It is also important to pinpoint that this method was thought to measure the
distortion introduced by white noise signals. Therefore, for it to suit our purposes,
we will have to make the introduced noise be near to white noise. We will achieve
it randomizing the frequency lines to modify.
To sum up, we are going to increase or decrease the values of the residues with
slight deviations over their original values, depending on their frequency and the
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Figure 5.2: Responses and tolerances (in dB) proposed in[21], by frequency.
tolerance to noise stablished in the standard ITU-R BS.468-4. This also follows
Fridrich and Goljan recommendations in [17], where they suggest to introduce
little changes in the signal in the shape of slight variations in its amplitudes, in-
stead of directly as just LSBs replacement. They justify this reasoning based in
the fact that the introduction of arbitrary Gaussian noise can be confused with the
noise, also Gaussian, introduced “naturally” during the capture and processing of
the carrier image. This is something that also occurs for auditive signals, which
also have Gaussian distribution in frequency domain. To assert that the introduced
noise follows a Gaussian distribution, we should analyze more deeply the statisti-
cal properties of the method, but we left that as future work. Nevertheless, even in
the case that it did not follow a Gaussian distribution, it is not incompatible with
being white noise, so it could be adapted to also fulfill the Gaussian requirement.
I.e., the recommendation ITU-R BS. 468-4 refers to white noise signals, but for
a noise to be white it needs to be present in the whole frequency spectrum, while
the fact of being Gaussian refers to the values adopted by the signal, in amplitude.
Moreover, given the characteristics of the weighting curve shown in 5.1, it does
not seem risky to adventure ourselves to thinking that the introduced variations
will follow a Gaussian distribution (or very similar).
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5.1.1 Subliminal residues randomization
As we have just commented, the method stablished in the standard ITU-R BS.468-
R is suitable for white noise, therefore, we have to introduce noise of this kind.
To do it, we will create a pseudo random sequence of numbers, from a secret
key shared between the sender and receiver, and certain parameters of the current
frame, accessible by both of them. By using a pseudo random ordering of the
residues, we statistically guarantee that the variation introduced in the frequency
lines will have the shape of a white noise.
5.1.2 System of ranges of values
We have already stablished a working interval. I.e., given a residual value x0,
the sender will move in the interval [x0 + ∆+, x0 − ∆−], where ∆+ and ∆−
are the values max increase and max decrease from algorithm 1. But it is not
just that. We also know that that interval is, in mean, and with a theoretic base
given by the ITU-R BS.468-4, secure in terms of perceptual sensitivity of the
introduced changes (in the conclusion section we’ll see some drawbacks, though).
The problem is that the sender does not control which bits will he hide, as they
are given by the message itself. Therefore, the specific value that the residue will
take inside the working interval is, a priori, undetermined. Moreover, at this point,
the receiver does not even know if the sender hided 1, 2, 3, 4, ... bits in a specific
residue. This is a matter that, although it is not purely steganographic, is crucial
for creating an steganographic system.
The explanation of how will the receiver know how many subliminal bits are
hidden in a given residue will be shown with a practical example. Lets suppose
that the valid values for a given residue, using our algorithm 1, are those in the
range [3, 9], being 6 the original value. In that interval, we have 3 possible subin-
tervals of 2 (values 2 and 3), 3 (values 4 to 7) and 4 (values 8 to 15) bits, being
the number of bits in the range indicated by the most significant bit. Moreover,
given that the limits are 3 and 9, two of these subintervals are not complete, as
2 and values greater than 9 are outside the stablished limits. Nevertheless, these
outsider values might still happen depending on the bits of the subliminal mes-
sage. Therefore, in binary, the final residue must vary between 112 and 10012,
but we shouldn’t hide any 4 bits. For instance, if we decided to hide 4 subliminal
bits, but those 4 bits turn out to be 00112, which is inside the valid interval, the
reciver will receive a value of 310. But, how will the receiver do to determine that
the sender hided 4 bits in that 310? We could think of making the inverse opera-
tions to those the sender did using the algorithm 1. Nevertheless, in this case, the
reference value will be 3, while the sender used 6 (and the receiver has no way
to know this 6, case in which steganography won’t be needed). Therefore, the
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obtained values will be different. Given that we cannot calculate or even estimate
by any means the number of bits hidden, we have to stablish an action protocol
that lets the sender to “signal” how many bits he has used in a given residue. We
have to options: use fixed ranges of values, i.e., if the value is in the range [x, y],
then there will be rx,y subliminal bits; or we could use dynamic ranges, signaled
in some other way. Given the intervals stablished by the algorithm 1 are them-
selves dynamic, depending on the reference value, and we cannot guarantee that
all the values in a fixed range will belong to the acceptable range by the ITU-R
BS.468-4, we will use dynamic ranges. We will stablish them in the following
way: sacrificing one subiliminal bit, we will use the most significant bit as a sig-
nal to indicate that, or the subsequent bits are subliminal. I.e., for the value 10012,
the subliminal bits will be 0012, and in 112, it will be 12. Returning to the hiding
process, if we have the working interval [3, 9], we know that, with our method,
we will be able to hide at most 3 bits (10012 is the grater acceptable value, with 3
subliminal bits). Therefore, we will try first to hide 3 bits, then 2 bits, and finally
1 bit, keeping the value that fits the acceptable range. Lets suppose that, the next
3 subliminal bits to hide are 1112. Fixing the most significant bit, if we try to
hide the 3 bits, we will obtain 11112, which is outside the acceptable range and
we have to discard it; the next step is to try hiding just 2 subliminal bits, which
gives us 1112, which is inside the acceptable range, and so we will use it, as is the
value that gives us the higher acceptable subliminal capacity. The receiver, get-
ting the value 710 = 1112, will discard the most significant bit and keep the two
subsequent ones, reading therefore the value 112 as subliminal bits. The fact of
begin trying with the higher possible number of bits to hide is to get the maximum
acceptable subliminal capacity.
An sharp reader will have noticed that the sender won’t allways obtain a se-
quence of bits that gives an acceptable value, given the allowed range. For exmaple,
lets suppose that the acceptable range is [3, 4], so we could hide at most two sub-
liminal bits, wich turn out to be 012. The first option will be 1012 = 510, which is
out of range, and the second will be 102 = 210 which is also out of range. More-
over, we cannot skip arbitrary residues because this will cause spurious reads at
the receiver side. In that cases, we will take the option that minimizes the intro-
duced error. Nevertheless, we have seen empirically that these cases are not very
common, so we won’t worry for them, at least for now.
5.1.3 Bit hiding methods
To hide the subliminal bits, we can just take the subliminal bitstream and hide it
as it comes, method that we will name direct hiding. But, besides this option, we
offer an alternative that provides certain advantages. This is the method called
parity bit method in [24, 1]. Basically, it takes x bits from some bitstream source,
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the subliminal bit to be sent, and hides it as the parity of the bit to send and the
parity of the previous x bits. This way, the probability of obtaining a bit to 1 or
a bit to 0 exponentially reaches 0.5 (see figure 5.3). Therefore, we will erase any
statistical property from the message data, even if it does not come encrypted. This
will make easier to mantain the statistical properties of the carrier, may we want to
do so. As a bitstream source for the x bits used for the parity calculation, we will
use the floor vector. This does not pose any computational problem, nor makes
hard the hiding process, as at this point, the floor has already been computed.
Figure 5.3: Probability of obtaining a bit to 1 using the parity bit method, as
a function of the number of bits used to calculate the parity. At the left, the
probability of 0 in the original stream is 0.4, 0.6 and 1. At the right, the probability
of 0 is 0.2. Even in that latter case, the probability of 1 evolves rapidly to 0.5.
5.2 Synchronization
An important matter for every steganographic method that does not follow a fixed
pattern for hiding information (e.g., using always the same least significant bit) is
the synchronization between sender and receiver. In the subsection 5.1.2 we talked
about this matter, but a lowest level, i.e., bit to bit synchronization. What concerns
us now is the frame to frame synchronization. I.e., the sender can decide not to
hide information at a given frame, may be because there is no more information
to send, or because the current frame does not have enough subliminal capacity.
Therefore, the sender will have to mark somehow to the receiver whether a given
frame carries subliminal information or not.
A classic approach for the resolution of this problem is the introduction of a
synchronization field, i.e., a predetermined number of bits to tell the receiver if
a given frame carries subliminal information. This method is simple and works.
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It just requires a few bits at the beginning of the frame. Nevertheless, it makes
us lose capacity for the pure subliminal data (not metadata). Therefore, in our
system, besides this classical approach, we offer the possibility of syncrhonization
using the Spread Spectrum technique presented in section 4.1.4. By using this
synchronization method, we create a pure steganographic system, where every
data and metadata is hidden by steganographic means, excluding an exception we
comment in the next section.
5.2.1 Synchronization by floor marking
In the introduction of this chapter we claimed that it is not advisable to introduce
great modifications in the floor vector, being the residual vector more suitable for
that end. Nevertheless, little modificaitons in the floor vector may pass unper-
ceived. Returning to the steganographic methods studied in the previous chapter,
we recall that there was a method, based in Spread Spectrum techniques, that
was mostly used for the transmission of little amounts of information (although
it could be modified for higher capacities). The concrete method we propose for
what matters us now is the ISS method, presented in [28] and studied briefly in
section 4.1.4. As we saw there, the method worked by introducing slight varia-
tions in the carrier, dispersed along the frequency lines. This modifications will
vary their sign depending on a watermark randomized initially using a secret key
and the bit of inforation to hide. Moreover, among the alternatives proposed in
[28], we use the one that limits the introduced distortion, as this is what interests
us the most. In order to limit the distortion, we have to define ranges, out of which
we won’t introduce de watermark. In our case, we will use the same criteria that
the one used for the modification of the residual vectors. Namely, we won’t allow
the distortion to exceed the limits established in the ITU-R BS.468-4. For more
details about the method, see [28, “section V.B ISS With Limited Distortion”].
Therefore, the ISS method adapts itself perfectly to our strict requirements for
the floor modifications. Moreover, recalling the Vorbis implementation, given
that the floor is obtained initially, and subtracted from the original signal to give
place to the residual vector, if we slightly increment the floor vector at a given
frequency, this effect will be counteracted at some extent by a smallest value of
the corresponding residue, and viceversa.
What we will do to achieve frame to frame synchronization is what follows: if
the sender wants to mark a frame as subliminal information carrier, he will mark
the floor, using ISS, with a 1 bit, using the secret key known by both sender and re-
ceiver; if he wants to mark a frame as not carrier of subliminal information, he will
mark the floor with a 0 bit. This way, the receiver, applying the inverse operation,
will know if a given frame does, or does not, contain subliminal information.
Nevertheless, as it is explained in [28], it may not be possible to mark a given
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vector. In that cases we cannot allow a false positive or false negative to happen,
because that will cause the receiver to de-synchronize with the sender, producing
a senseless bitstream. To avoid that, we use the algorithm depicted in 2 which
establishes a protocol that won’t allow that to happen:
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for synchronization with ISS.
1: if hide subliminal information then
2: success = mark floor(1)
3: if success = no then
4: success = classic sync
5: if success = no then
6: mark floor(0)
7: end if
8: end if
9: else
10: success = mark floor(0)
11: if success = no then
12: classic sync
13: end if
14: end if
5.3 Usage of the subliminal channel
We still have something left to solve. We know how will the sender and the re-
ceiver do to agree in whether a frame carries subliminal information or not. But,
how will they do to agree in how many subliminal bits will shelter a specific
residual coefficient? If the total capacity of a frame is 100 bits, but the sender just
wants to hide 25, he will use the method explained above to signal the frame as
subliminal information carrier. But given that he is not going to use all the residual
coefficients, the receiver will recover false subliminal bits if he reads all 100 bits.
Given the coding method for residual coefficients, and the typical length of Vorbis
frames, we have estimated empirically that with 8 bits of information we can es-
tablish the exact number of bits a frame carries. Therefore, we have to somehow
send those 8 bits. Again, the choice could be to use the ISS method, but instead
of sending just 0 or 1, we could send the number of subliminal bits, for example,
by dividing the floor into 8 segments. But we must remember that we don’t want
to introduce big variations in the floor vector. Moreover, Vorbis does not send the
complete floor vector, for example, if the floor has 512 frequency lines, a typicall
setting will be to send 20 of them, being the rest obtained by interpolation. There-
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fore, hide 8 bits of information in a vector of 20 elements exceeds the allowed
distortion limits. So all we can do is, for this purpose, use the classical method of
using a field for metadata. Therefore, if we are synchronizing with ISS, the first
8 bits of the channel will indicate the exact number of subliminal bits included,
whilst for the classic synchronization method, those 8 bits will immediatly follow
the synchronization field.
Chapter 6
Structure and design of the system
6.1 General description of the system
The system will be composed by two main layers. The inferior one will be the
steganographic layer, and therefore, where we will spend more effort. This layer
will implement the steganographic protocol presented in chapter 5. In short, given
a bitstream of subliminal message, and a bitstream of carrier signal, this layer will
produce the corresponding stego-signal, at the sender side. At the receiver side,
the inverse process will be performed, i.e., the steganographic layer will recover,
bit to bit, the subliminal message.
Besides the information hiding, it will be possible to cipher the subliminal data.
The main reason for this option is that, even although in an ideal case, an attacker
should never be capable of detecting the subliminal communication, it will be
quite innocent to assume that an attacker will never gain access to it. So, if to
the protection provided by steganography by hiding the information, we add the
protection of cryptography, by obfuscating it, if an attacker suspects of a stego-
object, he will not be able to recover the subliminal information if we use a robust
encryption method. Nevertheless, if the steganograic method does not leave any
trace (see the steganalythic methods base in fingerprint detection in subsection
4.2.4), thanks to the encryption, the attacker will never be sure with certainty
if the recovered bitstream is, indeed, subliminal information 1 Therefore, above
the steganographic layer, we will include a cryptographic one. Given that, be-
sides providing encryption, this layer will compress the data before sending them,
provide robustness to the system in the shape of packet numbering and integrity
checks, we will refer to this level as security level, rather than just cryptographic
level. A simple scheme of the stack of protocols is shown in the figure 6.1. The
1This could be arguable, nevertheless, we are refering to the case in which there is not enough
statistical evidence (or any other kind of evidence) to demonstrate the opposite.
77
78 CHAPTER 6. STRUCTURE AND DESIGN OF THE SYSTEM
main motivation for having chosen this architecture is to ease and improve the sys-
tem’s modularity, clearly differentiating the components with distinct functional-
ity and purpose. This way we improve the horizontal scalability of the system,
allowing the addition of new hiding and security algorithms, in case it is needed.
Figure 6.1: System’s protocol stack.
In [1, 32], hiding information systems are placed in a frame where the licit
extremes of the communication have to face attackers who will have computa-
tional and/or temporal resources potentially higher than theirs. But the attacker
resources will vary depending on the purpose of the information being hidden:
for watermarks used in copyrights, which have to protect data for several years,
who inserts the watermark has to be aware that, maybe 10 years later, a pirate
with a unimaginable powerful machine will try to break it; for steganographic
transmissions, although the supposed attack will probably occur in a near time
(and therefore, the computational resources will be similar), it is probable that the
attacker could allow himself to use as much time as he needed. Therefore, the
steganographic level will receive much more load at the sender side, which, log-
ically, will be the one hiding the data and the one which will have to guarantee,
as much as possible, that the invisibility and capacity requirements are achieved.
The receiver side of the system will be much lighter, given that it will only have
to extract and decipher using the corresponding algorithms and keys. Note that
this is also adapted to the Vorbis architecture, where the coder has a much higher
algorithmically complex coder, and a simpler decoder.
6.1.1 Software environment
The programming language we used for developing the steganographic library
will be C. This decision is based in the fact that the Vorbis codec is also imple-
mented in C. When possible, we have tried to avoid the modification of Vorbis
files. Nevertheless, it is unavoidable to introduce a bypass to pick the residues
and floors and pass them to the steganographic library. Excluding these modifica-
tions made to the Vorbis files, all the steganographic library has been implemented
independently.
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The implemented code, has been compiled using the same flags than Vorbis. In
fact, the scripts configure.ac2 and Makefile.am 3 used to manually install Vorbis
have been extended to install also the steganographic library.
According to the external libraries used, we have incorporated Libgcrypt [25].
This way we gain in modularity, using an open source cryptographic library, be-
longing to the GNU project, exhaustively tested and widely used. This library
makes available to us a wide variety of cryptographic algorithms. We will also
use the Zlib library[27] to compress the data before hiding. This library is also
open source and has been exhaustively tested.
As development platform, we have implemented and tested it in a Ubuntu Linux,
9.04, 9.10 and 10.04, and should be therefor easily portable to the other Debian
based distributions and even to the other Linux systems, given that we have used
coding rules following the standards. The configure and Makefile scripts also
include the compiling flags needed for different platforms. Nevertheless, the li-
brary has not been tested in other systems that the specified, so its behavior is not
guaranteed outside them.
6.1.2 Nomenclature
Of course, the system is composed by sender and receiver sides, which will try
respectivley to hide into and extract from the audio signal, the subliminal infor-
mation. Analogously to the Vorbis codec, where the coder and decoder sides use
functions to code and decode the floor and residual vectors which are named for-
ward and inverse, respectively, we will also name in that manner our sender and
receiver functions. This way we avoid the association to specific hiding algo-
rithms.
Although the security layer incoroporates ciphering, hashing and compression,
being its functionality more than merely cryptographic, it is possible that some-
times we refer to it as cryptographic layer, given that, at the beginning, we thought
of it as such.
6.1.3 Main software functions and user interface
At this point, the software functionality should be already clear. Our library will
allow the establishment of a subliminal channel in audio Vorbis tracks, incorpo-
rating compression, encryption and integrity checks.
Given that the final objective of this work is not to create a comercial software,
as user interface we will not use a graphical one. Instead, we’d rather extend the
2http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
3http://www.gnu.org/software/automake/
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tools provided with Vorbis, namely, oggenc and oggdec, to code a WAV file hiding
information into it, and decode a OGG file recovering the hidden information,
respectively.
The user interface must allow then to specify the parameters required by the
steganographic and security layers, which are listed below, specifying in paren-
thesis if the option belongs to the sender side, receiver side, or both.
- Hiding method (sende, receiver): The user must be able to specify the
way in which he wants the data to be hidden, either using the direct hiding
method or the parity bit method (see subsection 5.1.3).
- Synchronization method (sender, receiver): The user must be able to spec-
ify the synchronization method he wants to use, either the classic method
of synchronization via metadata headers or the method of synchronization
with floor marking (see subsection 5.2.1).
- Aggressiveness or channel usage (sender): The sender must be able to
specify the percentage of the total subliminal capacity he wants to make use
of, or, in short, the algorithm’s aggressiveness.
- Keys (sender, receiver): The user must be able to specify the master key
used to derive the needed keys for hiding, synchronizating and data encryp-
tion.
- IV (sender): The sender must be able to specify the initialization vector
used either to derive the keys or to initialize the encryption algorithms. This
vector should be passed as a header field to the receiver, as he should use
the same.
- Encryption method (sender, receiver): The user must be able to specify
the encryption algorithm. Currently, only RC4 is supported, given that it
is the only one with stream mode support in Libgcrypt. Nevertheless, the
extension to any other encryption algorithm supported by Libgcrypt should
be easy. For now, this parameter can be obviated.
- Digest method (sender, receiver): The user must be able to specify the
digest, or hashing, algorithm. Currently, only SHA1 is supported, although
again, the extension of the other algorithms supported by Libgcrypt should
be easy. For now, this parameter can be obviated.
- I/O files (sender, receiver): The user must be able to specify the input file
containing the data to be hidden (at the sender side) and the output file where
the recovered subliminal data will be stored (at the receiver side).
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As for the carrier file where the data will be hidden, at the sender side, and the
file from which it will be extracted at the receiver side, obviously the user must be
able to specify them. Nervertheless, as this functionality is already provided by
the Vorbis tools, we don’t have to worry about it.
6.2 Information and control flows
Once seen the global functionality required by the system, we can introduce now
in a more formal way the information flow. From it, we have obtained the desired
modular scheme. Knowing what information is managed in the system, what is
its purpose and where does it pass through, we will have enough knowledge of the
overall system behaviour. We will also differentiate between the information and
control flows of the steganographic layer and those of the security layer.
6.2.1 Steganographic layer
6.2.1.1 Data flow
The data flow is represented with DFDs (Data Flow Diagrams). Given that the
sender side (forward) and the receiver side (inverse) are independent, they will be
depicted in different diagrams. It is worth noting that, just by observing the DFDs,
one can imagine that most of the system load will fall on the forward side.
In the DFDs, the ellipses represent processes which transform or use the data in
some way; the rectangles are used to depict external agents (the user or the Vorbis
codec), and two horizaontal and parallel lines depict data stores (data structures
or files) intervening in the processing of the system’s information. The arrows
between the previous entities represent information flows between them. It is
important to have in mind that the DFDs do not establish the order of things,
although they let us make an idea. They just define the information flow, which
will later be used to produce an structural design of the system.
Forward
In the figure 6.2 we can see the data flow of the forward side of the sytem.
In the subsection of Data Dictionaries each of the data there depicted are
explained. As for the processes in it, they are explained below:
- “1. Obtain global configuration”: Processes the input parameters in-
troduced by the user to obtain the global configuration of the stegano-
graphic layer.
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- “2. Determine frame capacity limit”: From the floor and residue
vectors of each frame, this process will determine the recommended
capacity limits for that frame.
- “3. Calculate residue bits lineup”: From the capacity limits obtained
in the process 2 and the global configuration (mostly, the aggressive-
ness and amount of bits to hide), this process sets the amount of bits
to hide in each frequency coefficient of the given residue vector.
- “4. Determine marking method”: This process will establish if the
properties of a floor vector allow the usage of the ISS marking method
if this is the selected synchronization method. If not, or if the user has
requested the use of the classic synchronization method, the floor vec-
tor will be left untouched, indicating that the synchronization method
to use must be the insertion of a synchronization header in the frame.
- “5. Floor marking”: When the process 4 indicates that we can apply
the ISS marking method, and if there still remains data to hide, the
floor will be marked using the marking key (obviously, if this is the
selected marking method).
- “6. Obtain data to hide”: This process will obtain, from the security
layer buffer, the data to be hidden in the current frame and channel.
In case of classic synchronization, the synchronization field will be
inserted here. Also, a header field with the exact number of subliminal
bits hidden will be included.
- “7. Hide data in residue”: Using the bit lineup from process 3, this
process will hide in the residue the subliminal information received
from process 6, to produce the final stego-residue. Here, the hiding
method specified in the global configuration will be used.
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Figure 6.2: Data flow diagram of the sender side (forward) of the steganographic layer.
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Inverse
In figure 6.3 the data flow of the inverse side of the system can be seen.
Again, each flow is explained in the subsection of Data Dictionaries, and
now we describe the processes of the figure:
- “1. Get global configuration”: Processes the initial parameters spec-
ified by the user to obtain the global configuration of the stegano-
graphic layer.
- “2. Check floor marking”: If floor synchronization is used, this pro-
cess will estimate, using the marking key, the bit included in the cur-
rent floor vector using the ISS method. If the floor marking is not used,
this process will be ignored.
- “3. Recover subliminal information”: Depending on the estimation
by process 2 in case of ISS synchronization, or if a synchronization
header is received with the classic method, this process will recover
the subliminal information hidden in the residue. The subliminal in-
formation recovered here will be stored in the buffer of the security
layer.
6.2.1.2 Data dictionaries
- input parameters (forward, inverse): These are the parameters introduced
by the user and needed for hiding and unhiding the subliminal data. They
specify the behaviour and the actions to be carried at the sender or the re-
ceiver side. Basically, the parameteres will be those explained in the sub-
section 6.1.3 related to the steganographic layer. This parameters will be
processed and stored in the data structure that will represent the global sys-
tem configuration and will be stored for later use by other functions.
- global configuration (forward, inverse): This structure is obtained after
processing the input parameters, mainly, the hiding keys, hiding and syn-
chronization methods, aggressiveness, input files, and data derived from all
of them.
- floor current frame (forward, inverse): The Vorbis coder/decoder will pro-
vide floor vectors of the channels of each frame to the sender (forward) or
receiver (inverse). As we saw in 2.4, the floor vector represents the noise
mask of the current frame. Therefore, this is an essential information in the
data hiding process. Moreover, it will be used to synchronize the sender and
receiver in case of ISS synchronization.
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Figure 6.3: Data flow diagram of the receiver side (inverse) of the steganographic
layer.
- residue current frame (forward, inverse): The Vorbis coder/decoder will
provide residue vectors of the channels of each frame to the sender (for-
ward) or receiver (inverse) processes. These vectors will contain the sub-
liminal information itself.
- recommended limits (forward): This is the result of the process ”2. De-
termine frame capacity limit” at the sender side. From the floor vectors,
the sender will estimate the maximum amount of information that could be
hidden invisibly, producing a recommended limit. This limit will later be
used by the process “3. Calculate residue bits lineup” in order to establish
the exact distribution of the subliminal bits in the residue.
- residue lineup (forward): This is the output of the process “3. Calculate
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residue bits lineup”. It determines the exact pseudorandom order of the
residue coefficients of the current frame and channel. From this ordering
and the recommended limits obtained in the process “. Determine frame
capacity limit”, it will be possible to establish the exact amount of bits each
residue coefficient will shelter. At the time of hiding and recovering the
subliminal information, the decoder will use as many residue coefficients
as needed in order to get the number of bits indicated in the corresponding
header field.
- marking type (forward): As output of the process “4. Determine marking
method” will indicate the marking method to use, or marking type, which
will be later used to synchronize with the receiver.
- subliminal data (forward, inverse): These are the subliminal data hidden
at the sender side or recovered at the receiver side.
- stego-floor (forward): This will be the vector obtained after the synchro-
nization, and will obtain one bit of subliminal information in case of ISS
synchronization method. If ISS is not possible, then the stego-floor will be
exactly the same than the original floor vector.
- stego-residue (forward): This vector is the result of hiding the subliminal
data into the residue. Note that there will be cases where, either by need or
by impossibility, the residue vector remains the same.
- mark estimation (inverse): At the receiver side, the process “Check floor
marking” will estimate whether a given floor vector contains synchroniza-
tion information or not, to determine the way in which the corresponding
residue vector will be processed. In case the classic synchronization method
has already been specified, this step will be ignored.
6.2.1.3 Control flow
The data flow diagrams allows us to have an idea of the control flow of the sytem
for both the sender and the receiver sides. Nevertheless, the control flow diagrams
are depicted in figures 6.4 and 6.5 for both sides. It is worth noting that this control
flow also follows the natural order of the Vorbis codec, given that the floor vector
is computed first, and only after that, the residue vector is processed.
6.2.1.4 Packets of the steganographic level
To conclude the explanation of the data managed in the steganographic layer, we’ll
talk about the packet created by the sender and received by the recipient. We al-
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Figure 6.4: Control flow diagram of the sender side (forward) at the stegano-
graphic layer.
ready know that their structure will depend on the synchronization method, and
each one of those packets will be introduced in the residue vectors of the cur-
rent frame and channel. Therefore, if we are using classic synchronization, the
steganographic packets will have the structure shown in the image 6.6; if we are
using ISS synchronization, the structure will be that of figure 6.7.
The length of the synchronization field (SYNC), in case of classic synchroniza-
tion, it is currently set to 8 bits with value 0xFF , although it could be changed
to any 8-multiple value. The size field (SIZE) indicates the exact amount of sub-
liminal bits hidden in the current frame and channel. Although length the size
field could also be changed, we have empirically seen that 8 bits are enough. It is
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Figure 6.5: Control flow of the receiver side (inverse) at the steganographic layer.
Figure 6.6: Packet of the steganographic layer when classic synchronization is
used.
specified the number of bits instead of the number of bytes, because we can make
more precise fits, while forcing to include an exact number of bytes, the channel
could be over- or under-used.
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Figure 6.7: Packet of the steganographic layer when ISS synchronization is used.
6.2.2 Security layer
6.2.2.1 Data flow
As we did for the steganographic layer, we’ll differentiate here between sender
(forward) and receiver (inverse). Given that most of the functionality is provided
by external libraries, this layer is much simpler than the steganographic.
Forward
Figure 6.8: Data flow diagram of the sender side (forward) of the security layer.
- “1. Get global configuration”: Processes the input parameters intro-
duced by the user in order to obtain the security layer global configu-
ration.
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Figure 6.9: Data flow diagram of the receiver side (inverse) of the security layer.
- “2. Encryption”: Gets as many subliminal data as established in the
process “Get global configuration” and uses the encryption key, the
initialization vector and the specified algorithm to create the encryp-
tion environment (keys derivation and algorithm initialization). Once
created the environment, it encrypts the subliminal data.
- “3. Header inclusion”: Opposite to the packets of the steganographic
level, the security level packet contain a higher amount of metainfor-
mation, which will be included here. Specifically, the packet will in-
clude a synchronization field, the size of encrypted data in the packet,
the initialization vector used, and emission and packet identifiers.
- “4. Digest calculation”: Using the digest method specified by the
user, this process will introduce the digest of all the previous fields,
excluding the synchronization field. Its aim is to detect transmission
errors (deliberate or not). The synchronization field is excluded be-
cause, if any bit in that field is modified, the packet will be discarded
as no synchronization will occur, and therefore is useless to cover that
field. The resulting packet of concatenating the pre-packet obtained in
“3. Header inclusion” and the digest here calculated, will be directly
written in the security layer protocol, which acts as input buffer for the
steganographic layer.
Inverse
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- “1. Get global configuration”: Processes the input parameters intro-
duced by the user in order to obtain the security layer global configu-
ration.
- “2. Check header and integrity”: This process will initially check
that the first bits math the synchronization field, and if positive, it
will recover the remaining header fields: data length, IV, emission and
packet identifiers and, finally, the encrypted data and the integrity field.
At last, the process will repeat the calculation of the hash contained in
the last field, as the sender did, and see if it matches the received di-
gest. To do so, the digest algorithm specified in the process 1 will be
used.
- “3. Decrypt”: In case of obtaining an error free packet at the process
2, this process will decrypt the packet using the decryption algorithm
specified in the global configuration of the security layer, and the key
and IV derived from it.
6.2.2.2 Data dictionaries
- input parameters (forward, inverse): Introduced by the user as program
input, will be used to initialize the variables from which the security level
will ve configured. Specifically, the master key, the encryption and digest
algorithms and the initialization vectors.
- global configuration (forward, inverse): Will store the state variables needed
by the processes taking part in the security layer. It will be initialized with
the values established by the user input, and the values obtained from them.
- Encryption algorithm (forward, inverse): Encryption algorithm to use.
Will be specified by the user, or RC4 by default.
- Digest algorithm (forward, inverse):Digest algorithm to use. Will be spec-
ified by the user, or SHA1 by default.
- id em, id pckt, IV, key (forward, inverse): Respectivelly, the emission id,
packet id for the next expected packet, Initialization Vector and encryption
key. The two first are optional and are usually established to default values.
The next packet id will be incremented during the communication (each
time a packet is received). The Initialization Vector will be specified by
the user, or a default value will be utilized. Its purpose is to derive the
encryption key from the master key.
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- sub data (forward, inverse): Subliminal data obtained from the file to hide
(at the sender side) or recovered from a stego-frame (at the receiver side).
In both cases, it is plaintext data.
- encrypted sub data (forward, inverse): The data to hide in a cryptographic
packet at the sender side, or to be recovered from a cyptographic packet at
the receiver side.
- packet (forward, inverse): Represents a complete cryptographic packet,
composed by the synchronization field, data length, IV vector, emission
id, packet id, encrypted data, and integrity-check
- pre packet (forward): A cryptographic packet without the integrity-check
field.
6.2.2.3 Control flow
The control flow of the security level is trivial and can be derived directly from
the flow diagrams. We will not include, therefore, any control flow diagram, ex-
plaining it with words.
- forward: First, the encryption key will be derived, initializing the encryp-
tion method with the specified IV when necessary (there are algorithms that
do not require an IV, or use a default one). The result ofMD5(emission id.packet id)
will be encrypted with the master key, using the result as key for the current
frame. Subsequently, the cryptographic packet will be created, including
the synchronization, data length, IV, emission id, packet id and data (com-
pressed and encrypted) fields. The last step will be to calculate the digest of
all the previous fields excluding the synchronization field and adding it to
the packet.
- inverse: The receiver will check in first place that the first bytes (how many
is a variable parameter, established to 3 bytes by default), match the syn-
chronization header. If possitive, the remaining fields will be read. The
key for the current frame will be obtained reproducing the sender’s steps.
After recovering the data, the integrity check will be performed, and if the
integrity has been preserved, the data will be decrypted with the current
packet key, and decompressed at last. In case any of the previous steps fails,
the packet will be discarded.
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6.2.2.4 Security layer packets
Lastly, the packets created in the security layer, although they have already been
described several times, are depicted in the figure 6.10.
Figure 6.10: Security level packet.
The purpose and composition of each field is as follows:
- SYNC: The SYNC field is set to 3 bytes with the value 0xFFFFFF , al-
though its size and value can be modified. Its purpose is to serve as syn-
chronization between the security levels of sender and receiver, providing
greater robustness to the protocol.
- SIZE: The SIZE field will have 4 bytes of length, what allows us tu include
up to 232 − 1 bits of data in each cryptographic packet (which is more than
enough). It will allow the receiver to know how many bytes of data contains
a given cryptographic packet.
- IV: The IV field will be of 16 bytes, and will be set to the value indicated by
the user or to a default value if the user does not specify it. It will be used
to establish the internal state of the cryptographic algorithms that require an
IV to dreive the keys.
- ID EM: The ID EM field represents the emission identifier. It will have
a length of 4 bytes and will be set to a value specified by the user or to a
concrete value if the user does not provide it. Its purpose is to allow dif-
ferentiation between packets of different communications, as the stegano-
graphic library can be incorporated to streaming systems transmitting sev-
eral subliminal files, each one in a different communication (i.e., with dif-
ferent emission id).
- ID PCKT: The field ID PCKT will be the identifier of the current packet
and will have a length of 4 bytes. The first packet will be numbered accord-
ing to the value introduced by the user as initial packet, or set to 1 if the
user does not specify any number. Each time a packet is sent, the value will
be incremented by one. When the end of the communication is reached,
a packet with packet id set to 0 will be sent, indicating the receiver that
the communication is ended. This field provides robustness to the security
protocol, making possible to detect lost packets.
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- DATA: The proper data. This field will hava the length specified by the field
SIZE, in bytes, and will be encrypted and compressed.
- DIGEST: The digest of the fields SIZE, IV, ID EM, ID PCKT and DATA,
concatenated in this very order. It will allow to carry out integrity checks
over the received data, providing robustness to the protocol upon errors in-
troduced intentionally or accidentally during the transmission. The length
of the field will vary depending on the hashing algorithm specified by the
user, being the default length of 20 bytes (corresponding to the SHA1 algo-
rithm). Therefore, it is advisable to take into account the digest algorithm
in order to specify the default packet size, or vice versa, in order to avoid
hashing methods that will introduce too much overload.
6.3 Structural design of the system
From flow diagrams we derive the structural diagrams representative of the sys-
tem. These diagrams offer a hierarchical vision of it, accordingly to the modular
structure that we have pursued from the beginning. Each level of the resulting tree
depicts a different abstraction level, being the root the most abstract level and the
leaves the ultimate functions that are implemented in each layer (steganographic
and security).
Like we did in the previous section, we will differentiate between stegano-
graphic and security layers, and again, the former will be much more complex
than the latter.
6.3.1 Structural diagrams
In this subsection we will see the structural diagrams obtained during the design of
the system, which allow us to understand its basic structure. Given that the design
of the system is not the main objective of this work, it will not be too detailed.
6.3.1.1 Steganographic layer
As before, we will differentiate between the sender side, or forward, and the re-
ceiver, or inverse.
Forward
The structural diagram of the forward side, obtained from the data flow
diagram of figure 6.2, is shown in figure 6.11. Using a depth-first strategy
(and from left to right), the control flow shown in figure 6.4 is reproduced,
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ignoring the decision makings. Each of the arrows depict communications
between the different processes (communications with external entities, like
Vorbis or the user, are not depicted).
Figure 6.11: Structural diagram of the forward side at the steganographic layer.
The communications that take place in this diagram are as follows:
- global config: This is the data structure created from the user input,
and other data obtained from the carrier audio. In Fig. 6.11, it is cre-
ated by the process “Obtain global configuration” and it can be ob-
served, by means of the inter-processes communications, which pro-
cesses make use of it.
- capacity limits: A vector obtained in the process “Determine sublim-
inal capacity limit” which, calculated from the original frame vectors,
will indicate the capacity limit of each frequency coefficient. This
vector will be the same for all the aggressiveness levels, as it is not
based on the aggressiveness, but on the psychoacoustic properties of
the audio.
- residue lineup: This is the result of the function “Calculate residue
lineup”. It will be a vector establishing the relative ordeirng of the
residual coefficients.
- subliminal data: The subliminal data as they will be hided in the
residue vector. They are obtained in the function “Obtain subliminal
data”, where the chosen hiding method is applied. The length of the
subliminal data will be, at most, the sum of the elements in the vector
capacity limits.
96 CHAPTER 6. STRUCTURE AND DESIGN OF THE SYSTEM
Now we briefly comment the modules and functions taking part in the pro-
cess:
- Forward: This is the highest level function at the sender side. It uses
the global configuration created from the parameters introduced by the
users. It will analyze the subliminal capacity of the current frame, es-
tablishing the percentage of the channel to use by calling the function
Determine subliminal capacity limit”. This way we will be next to
the desired usage of the channel. Once done that, we establish the
lineup of the residue coefficients with the function “Calculate residue
lineup”. At last, the information will be hidden in the residue vec-
tor using the function “Information hiding”. Although the diagram
shows the function of floor marking as descendant of this function,
in the code, it is executed outside it, to adapt it better to the Vorbis
structure. Nevertheless, it is conceptually a descendant of the Forward
module, and it is so considered here.
- Obtain global configuration: Initializes the configuration structure
of the steganographic layer from the values introduced by the user,
or sets them to the default values. It also initializes all the auxiliar
variables.
- Mark floor: It is shown between question marks as it will not always
be executed. When this function is called, it will try to mark the floor
vector with the specified bit, returning, upon success the final floor, or
informing of the imposibility of doing so otherwise.
- Determine subliminal capacity limit: It analyzes the current frame,
using the algorithm 1 and updating the maximum value for the frame.
Morevoer, it calculates the maximum variation range for each residue
coefficient.
- Calculate residue lineup: Previous to calling this function, the pseu-
dorandom number generator should have been initialized with the seed
obtained from the master key. It will pseudorandomly sort all the
residue coefficients, although maybe not all of them are later used.
- Information hiding: This function will use the subliminal capacity
limits for each residue coefficient obtained in Determine subliminal
capacity limit and their ordering in order to produce the final stego-
frame. To do so, it will call the functions Obtain subliminal data and
Write in subliminal channel.
- Obtain subliminal data: This function will make use of the specified
hiding method (one of the methods specified in section 5.1.3) to obtain
the bitstream to write in the subliminal channel “as is”.
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- Write in subliminal channel: This function will go through all the
residue coefficients following the ordering established in Calculate
residue lineup. It will try to hide as many bits of the bitstream ob-
tained in Obtain subliminal data as possible for each coefficient. The
resulting values of each coefficient should not exceed the limits estab-
lished by Determine subliminal capacity limit.
Inverse
In the figure 6.12 it is shown the structural diagram related to the data flow
diagram of the figure 6.12. As for the forward side, if we follow a depth-
first order and from left to right, we can approximately see the control flow
of the application as shown before.
Figure 6.12: Structural diagram of the inverse side of the stegangraphic layer.
The communications between processes in the structural diagram of the In-
verse side, are as follows:
- global config: This is the data structure created from the input data
introduced by the user, and some other data obtained from the carrier
audio. In the figure 6.12, it is produced by the process Obtain global
configuration and the diagram communications show what processes
make use of it.
- marking estimation: The process Check floor marking will deter-
mine, in case ISS synchronization is used, the bit of information car-
ried by the floor vector.
The modules and functions taking part in the process are as follows:
- Inverse: It recovers the subliminal information from the steganographic
channel.
- Obtain global configuration: Initializes the cryptographic layer from
the values introduced by the user, or sets them to the defaults. It also
sets up all the required auxiliar variables.
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- Check floor marking: This function will check, using the secret wa-
termark, for the presence of a mark equal to “1” or “0”. Like for the
sender, this function will only be called in case we use ISS synchro-
nization, and will produce an estimation of the received mark.
- Recover information from subliminal channel: In case of classic
synchronization, this function will check if the synchronization header
is present. In case of ISS synchronization, even if the estimated bit
at Check floor marking is 1, it will chekc the first bits to avoid false
synchronizations or de-synchronizations (i.e., receive a bit to 1 one in
the floor vector when there is no subliminal information in the residue
vector, or viceversa).
6.3.1.2 Security level
This level is much simpler, given that the more complex functionality (encryp-
tion, integrity checks, etc.) falls on the external library Libgcrypt. Specifically,
its interface is just composed by the functions related to the initialization of the
security layer and to the production and analysis of the sent and received crypto-
graphic packets. The structural diagrams corresponding to the sender and receiver
sides are shown in the figures 6.13 and 6.14.
Forward
Figure 6.13: Structural diagram of the forward side at the security level.
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The communications between processes, shown in the structural diagram of
the Forward side shown in figure 6.13, are as follows:
- global config: Represents the global configuration of the security layer.
It will be initialized to default values or to the values introduced by the
user. Its most important component is the master key from which the
encryption keys for each frame will be derived.
- buffer: The security layer buffer. It is essential for the whole system,
since it is the only interaction point between the steganographic and
security layers. At the sender’s side, the steganographic layer will read
from it the data to be hidden; at the receiver’s side, the steganographic
layer will write in it the data recovered from the subliminal channel.
Every module and function taking part in the process, are stored in the file
cryptos channel.c. Below we see the interface functions corresponding to
the diagram 6.13:
- Forward This is the highest level function at the sender side. From the
global configuration establish within the functions Security layer con-
figuration and Security buffer configuration, this function will create
a new cryptographic packet by calling the function Produce crypto-
graphic packet.
- Get configuration: In this case, this module has been divided in
two functions described below. Nevertheless, in the diagram they are
grouped in this “virtual function” in order to depict their obvious rela-
tion within the layer security: which is to initialize it.
- Security layer configuration: This function will initialize all the vari-
ables and structures related to the cryptographic funcionality, e.g., en-
cryption handlers, handlers for the digest algorithms, master keys, IV,
etc.
- Configuration of the security layer buffer: This function will ini-
tialize the buffer that will serve to comunicate the steganographic and
security levels. It has been separated from the global configuration
function due to its role as connection point between both levels.
- Produce cryptographic packet: This function will create a byte stream
to hide as data for the steganographic level. This byte stream will com-
pose by itself a security level packet. It will contain headers for the
security level, encrypted data and the digest field for integrity checks.
The resulting packet will be written in the cryptographic buffer.
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Figure 6.14: Structure diagram for the inverse side of the security level.
Inverse
In this case, the communications between functions and the functions them-
selves shown in the diagram of the figure 6.14 are essentially the same
than those described fot the structural diagram of the figure 6.14. The only
change is the function Produce cryptographic packet, which is replaced by
the function Analyze cryptographic packet, whose task will be to recover
the header field, decipher the data and check the integrity field. Also, in-
stead writting in the cryptographic buffer, we will be reading from it. Each
time the function is called, it will check first the bytes of the header’s syn-
chronization field. If synchronization occurs, it will continue analyzing the
packet; in any other case, the unmatched bytes will be discarded (probably a
desynchronization has occured due to data loss) and nothing will be written
in the destination file descriptor.
6.4 Installation and usage
Like we said at the beginning of this chapter, the steganographic library depends
on two external libraries, Libgcrypt and Zlib. For Linux platforms, these libraries
can be downloaded and installed following the instructions given within the dis-
tribution files, or by means of the official repositories or autoinstaller packages
(.rpm and .deb). We recommend, when possible, to use the official repositories,
to obtain a better integration within the system.
Once satisfied the external libraries dependencies, the library can be configured,
complied and installed with the following chain of commands, which must be
executed from the libvorbis-1.2.3 of the distribution file:
./configure
make vorbisteg
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make install
If the previous instructions fail, a autoreconf -I m4 command should be
executed, followed by automake -a. To compile with debug flags, instead of
using make vorbisteg, use make vorbistegdebug. The original objec-
tives of the Makefile are also preserved, so by executing makewithout arguments,
the Vorbis library version 1.2.3 will be compiled.
Once compiled and installed the steganographic libraries, the Vorbis-tools should
be also installed. To do so, from the directory vorbis-tools-1.2.0 the same steps
than above should be executed.
As for the usage of the library, to codify a wav file, hiding information, the
needed tool is oggenc (which has been modified to do so), and for the inverse
task, the corresponding tool is oggdec. By calling both programs without argu-
ments, a list of input paramters is shown at the standard output, both the typical
Vorbis commands and the ones exclusive to the steganographic library Vorbis-
tego. For example, to hide a file “hidden.dat” in the track “carrier.wav”, with key
“secretkey1234”, using classic synchronization and parity bit hiding, and with ag-
gressiveness (percentage of subliminal channel used) of 30%, the command is as
follows:
oggenc carrier.wav -q 6 --shm 0 --ssm 0 --sfile
hidden.dat --skey secretkey1234 --sda 3
Which will produce as output the file “carrier.ogg”, with the file “hidden.dat”
hidden into it. Before ending the program execution, it will inform (unless the
modifier --quiet has been specified) of the final usage given to the sublimi-
nal channel, or if any error occured, like impossibility of completely hiding the
complete file.
To recover the file “hidden.dat”, writting it into the file “output.stg”, the corre-
sponding command is:
oggdec carrier.ogg --shm 0 --ssm 0 --sfile output.stg
--skey secretkey1234
As a result, the file “output.stg” will be created in the current directory, if the
complete file was successfully hidden at the sender side.
To use the steganographic library in applications which offer streaming func-
tionality, like the official Vorbies’ streaming server, Icecast, we have two options
to specify the configuration parameters. If using a script for specifying the audio
sources to the coder, the parameters can be directly specified within the script;
instead, there is the possibility to create a file called vorbistego config,
which must be in the same directory than the streaming server. The contents of
this file must be the same as if we were calling the applications oggenc/oggdec
from command line, but, substituting oggenc/oggdec by vorbistego config.
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For instance, using the same configuration as before, the contents of the file must
be:
vorbistego config carrier.wav -q 6 --shm 0 --ssm 0
--sfile hidden.dat --skey secretkey1234 --sda 3
The receiver should execute some multimedia program, like VLC, to read the
audio stream. Therefore, it will only be able to specify the configuration paramters
by means of the file vorbistego config, given that these programs call di-
rectly the Vorbis library (and the steganographic library in turn). During tests
performed within this work, we have used the software VLC, which natively in-
cludes the Libgcrypt library, so we recommend its usage here. Other applications
have not been tested. It is worth noting nevertheless that it is essential to create
a vorbistego config and locate it in the same directory than the receiver
program. In any other case, the behaviour of the steganographic library is unde-
termined, given that is global variables will not be correctly initialized.
Lastly, a limitation that we have not commented until now, is that the program
has to be executed with a Vorbis codec quality equal or greater than 6. This is
due to the inferior qualities introduce lossy residue coupling, in which it is not
straightforward to measure the distortion introduced by the variations in the resid-
ual coefficients. As told in the conclusion of the work, that remains for future
work.
Chapter 7
Results analysis
In this chapter, we will proceed to analyze and evaluate the obtained results, in
terms of capacity and both acoustic and statistic imperceptibility. For the tests
carried out for this analysis, we have used two different audio tracks, with different
features, that will allow us to study how does the system behave upon the distinct
properties of the carrier. The first audio track, to which we will refer as track1, is
a Rock song, containing a high noise level and abrupt changes in all the frequency
lines; the second track, to which we will refer as track2, is a classical music song,
with much less noise and the changes in intensity much more localized in the
frequency spectrum. The obtained results are explained in the following sections.
7.1 Capacity
We have measured the method’s capacity empirically, by hiding relatively big
files in the test audio tracks. At first, we would expect for the track1 to offer a
higher capacity, given its higher noise level. It is important to note that, even for
an identical system configuration (same aggressiveness, hiding and synchroniza-
tion methods, etc.), the subliminal capacity of the same track will slightly vary
depending on the information to hide. This is due to the fact that, depending on
the subliminal bits themselves, the introduced distortion during the hiding process
will be different. More clearly, if we want to hide a subliminal bit that matches the
bit which it will substitute, the introduced distortion will be zero; on the other hand
if both bits are different, there will be distortion. We also differentiate between
the two modes of the algorithm, given that, although the subliminal capacity of
the track is the same (ignoring the slight differences that we have just mentioned),
the degree of use of the channel varies from one mode to another. Specifically,
with ISS synchronization the header size is smaller.
We will depict here the “pure” subliminal capacity, i.e., including metadata, and
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the “refined” capacity, i.e., excluding metadata and only taking into account the
information we really want to transmit. Given that the method allows to apply
different aggressiveness or channel usage levels, we will depict only the sublimi-
nal capacity for a usage of 100% of the channel. Other capacities can be deduced
straightforward, ignoring the slight variations introduced by the effect explained
in the preceeding paragraph and rounding errors. All the capacity amount are
specified in bits.
Track Hiding Synchronization Pure capacity Refined capacity Ratio
Track1 Direct Classic 5725850 5167338 0.90
Track1 Direct ISS 5680809 5411585 0.95
Track1 Parity bit Classic 5725489 5166977 0.90
Track1 Parity bit ISS 5674389 5405165 0.95
Track2 Direct Classic 1413018 1269658 0.90
Track2 Direct ISS 1462832 1391896 0.95
Track2 Parity bit Classic 1413204 1269844 0.90
Track2 Parity bit ISS 1461095 1390159 0.95
Table 7.1: Capacities of the method, with aggressiveness of 100% and the different
modes.
Taking into account that the size of track1 is roughly 6.5 MB and the size of
track2 is 2.0 MB, for the track1 the subliminal information represents around the
10.5% of the final file size, while for the track2 the resulting proportion is approx-
imately of 8.5%. These confirms our initial bet, obtaining a higher subliminal
capacity for track1. We can also see that the ISS method indeed offers a higher
usage of the channel (shown at the rightmost column, ratio), which is roughly of
95% for ISS and of 90% for classic synchronization. Of course, in this calculation
we do not consider the security layer headers as metadata since, to the eyes of the
steganographic layer, they are just data to hide. Nevertheless, the “pure” sublimi-
nal capacity for the ISS method is slightly lesser, but it could be due to the indirect
modifications that the residue vectors suffer when varying the floor vectors.
7.2 Psychoacoustic imperceptibility
This type of imperceptibility, as we saw in section 2.1, depends on where do
we introduce the subliminal information. Moreover, the final result may depend
on who listens the audio, as not everyone has the same sensibility, e.g., to high
frequencies in the acoustic spectrum.
In the audio coding and compressing world, an specific kind of tests is used in
order to measure the level of goodness of an audio codec. These tests are called
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ABX tests (see [46]), and are directed to the final codec users, i.e., people. An
ABX test works as follows:
1 : The subject listens a first audio track, the track A, which contains the
original (uncompressed) audio.
2 : Immediatly after, the subject listens a second audio track, the track B,
which contains the audio codified using the codec being tested.
3 : Once the subject has listened both, a third audio track, X, is played. This
track will be randomly selected to be either A or B, but the subject is not
told which.
4 : Finally, the subject has to decide whether the X track was track A or track
B.
This process is repeated as many times as possible, and for different subjects,
taking notes of the results (if they have guessed correctly or not). If the audio
codec is good, the results will show approximately the same number of right
guesses than wrong guesses.
To perform this test, which we can compare to the visual steganalysis seen in
4.2.3 (we could call this acoustic steganalysis), we created a web site were we
uploaded a total of 24 ABX tests. These tests were composed by 10 second audio
tracks. 12 of these 24 tests were track1 and the other 12 were track2. For each
track we have used the 4 working modes of the system, i.e., the 4 possible com-
binations of ISS and classic synchronization, and direct and parity bit hiding. For
each combination we have used a 30%, 60% and 90% of the subliminal capacity.
Therefore having 3 capacities per each 4 combinations makes 12 clips for track1
and the other 12 for track2. After uploading these tests, friends and family per-
formed them, with the aim of determine as objectively as possible the final quality
of the stego-audio tracks produced. A priori, we would expect that the changes
are less noticeable as the usage of the channel decreases. The obtained results are
shown in table 7.2.
For proving that a system is imperceptible, the rate of correct guesses at each test
(shown in the column rate, in percentage) should be roughly 50%. The idea is the
same as proving if a coin is fair. The coin might have been fixed in order to obtain
more tails, or to obtain more heads. In our case, the method will not be effective
both if people guess correctly most of the time or if they guess incorrectly, as the
information provided in both cases is the same. Therefore, following the fair coin
metaphore, we use the bilateral p-value, which contemplates obtaining too much
tails or too much heads, instead of just too much tails or just too much heads.
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Test Track Hiding Synchronization Aggressiveness Right guesses Tests Rate Bilateral p-value
1 track1 Direct Classic 30% 18 34 0.53 0.864
2 track1 Direct Classic 60% 22 33 0.66 0.080
3 track1 Direct Classic 90% 24 33 0.72 0.013
4 track1 Direct ISS 30% 17 33 0.51 1.00
5 track1 Direct ISS 60% 22 33 0.66 0.080
6 track1 Direct ISS 90% 23 33 0.70 0.035
7 track1 Parity bit Cla´sico 30% 18 33 0.54 0.728
8 track1 Parity bit Cla´sico 60% 26 33 0.79 0.001
9 track1 Parity bit Cla´sico 90% 21 33 0.63 0.162
10 track1 Parity bit ISS 30% 16 32 0.50 1.00
11 track1 Parity bit ISS 60% 23 32 0.72 0.020
12 track1 Parity bit ISS 90% 23 32 0.72 0.020
13 track2 Direct Classic 30% 17 30 0.56 0.584
14 track2 Direct Classic 60% 21 30 0.70 0.042
15 track2 Direct Classic 90% 20 30 0.66 0.098
16 track2 Direct ISS 30% 17 30 0.56 0.584
17 track2 Direct ISS 60% 19 30 0.63 0.200
18 track2 Direct ISS 90% 17 30 0.56 0.584
19 track2 Parity bit Classic 30% 14 32 0.44 0.890
20 track2 Parity bit Classic 60% 19 30 0.63 0.200
21 track2 Parity bit Classic 90% 19 30 0.63 0.200
22 track2 Parity bit ISS 30% 17 30 0.56 0.584
23 track2 Pariyt bit ISS 60% 19 30 0.63 0.200
24 track2 Parity bit ISS 90% 21 30 0.70 0.042
Table 7.2: Resultados de las pruebas ABX realizadas.
7.3. STATISTICAL IMPERCEPTIBILITY 107
Being that so, the column bilateral p-value shows the probability of obtaining
a given deviation with respect to the equilibrium between correct and incorrect
guesses, assuming that our null hypothesis, “The implemented stego-system is
acoustically imperceptible”, is true. Therefore, according to the table 7.2, we can
see that in the cases of a usage of 30% take values above of 0.5, being several of
them near 1. But, excluding the test 18, with a p-value of 0.584%, the remaining
tests with a channel usage of 60% or 90% have obtained values equal to or less
than 0.2.
Leaving aside that probably between 34 and 30 hearings for each tests do not
provide enough statistical evidence, we can make a preliminar evaluation. We
can conclude that for aggressiveness of near 30%, it is highly probable that the
null hypothesis holds. Nevertheless, there are several cases with more aggressive
configurations for which we have obtained quite low p-values. Specifically those
below 0.05 (which is a typical p-value threshold to refute the null hypothesis) help
us thought that the method is acoustically perceptible, as the null hypothesis does
not hold.
7.3 Statistical imperceptibility
To finish, we will measure the statistical imperceptibility, or at least, we will try
to establish a path to show where could we look for statistical anomalies. For the
results here shown to be useful and considered effective, they have to be repro-
ducible form the stego-audio aone, because we assume that the attacker will not
have any other information available.
Given that the algorithm works in the frequency domain, every statistical mea-
sure here obtained are related to that domain. For all the variations of our method,
we have analyzed the entropy variations introduced in the bitstream obtained when
recovering the subliminal data; we have also analyzed the variations introduced in
the residue vectors, comparing the mean values and standard deviations between
frames and frequency lines. We have specially center our atention in the residue
vectors because they shelter the great part of the subliminal information. Nev-
ertheless, for the methods using ISS synchronization, we have also analyzed the
modifications introduced into the floor vector. To consider the method a robust
one, the modifications must not leave any detectable pattern, and shoul approxi-
mate the statistical model of the cover audio.
7.3.1 Entropy analysis
To compare the modifications in entropy, we have analyzed first the two origi-
nal tracks as if they carried subliminal information, analyzing the entropy of the
108 CHAPTER 7. RESULTS ANALYSIS
resulting bitstream with the software ent of Fourmilab1. Subsequently, we have
analyzed the bitstreams resulting after hiding information with our stego-system,
using also the software ent. For these stego-audios we have used the same con-
figurations that we have been using before. The results are shown in the table 7.4
and the entropies of the original tracks are shown in the table 7.3. In both tables,
the shown entropy values correspond with the entropy per analyzed byte.
Track Entropy
track1 7.201244
track2 7.258238
Table 7.3: Results of the entropy analysis over the original bitstream.
Test Track Hiding Synchronization Aggressiveness Entropy
1 track1 Direct Classic 30% 7.704599
2 track1 Direct Classic 60% 7.931518
3 track1 Direct Classic 90% 7.984385
4 track1 Direct ISS 30% 7.581057
5 track1 Direct ISS 60% 7.854184
6 track1 Direct ISS 90% 7.966511
7 track1 Parity bit Classic 30% 7.673614
8 track1 Parity bit Classic 60% 7.919495
9 track1 Parity bit Classic 90% 7.997222
10 track1 Parity bit ISS 30% 7.607645
11 track1 Parity bit ISS 60% 7.883938
12 track1 Parity bit ISS 90% 7.985163
13 track2 Direct Classic 30% 7.748209
14 track2 Direct Classic 60% 7.933408
15 track2 Direct Classic 90% 7.976730
16 track2 Direct ISS 30% 7.653738
17 track2 Direct ISS 60% 7.874453
18 track2 Direct ISS 90% 7.970202
19 track2 Parity bit Classic 30% 7.694429
20 track2 Parity bit Classic 60% 7.919652
21 track2 Parity bit Classic 90% 7.993561
22 track2 Parity bit ISS 30% 7.689393
23 track2 Parity bit ISS 60% 7.889819
24 track2 Parity bit ISS 90% 7.992366
Table 7.4: Results of the entropy analysis.
1http://www.fourmilab.ch/random/
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We can observe how, while the original tracks keep an entropy of roughly 7.2
bits per byte, the tracks with subliminal information take values between 7.6 and
7.99 approximately. More in detail, the tracks with a channel usage of 30% are
near 7.6, the tracks using the 60% of the channel hovering around 7.9 and the
tracks with a 90% of channel usage taking an entropy per byte of 7.99 bits. Again,
having used only two tracks for testing purposes does not provide enough evi-
dence, nevertheless it shows us a possible way to steganalyze the algorithm (and
also to improve it!). We can say so since, from the obtained results, we can appre-
ciate an increase of the entropy of at least 0.5 bits per byte when hiding informa-
tion. This is a logical consequence of the hiding method, since most of the hidden
bits are encrypted, what makes its entropy increase to a maximum.
7.3.2 Analysis of mean values and standard deviations
Here we have obtained, for each configuration of our steganographic algorithm
used in the ABX tests, the inter-frame mean values per frequency line (i.e., the
mean values of all the residue coefficients of each frequency, calculated from ev-
ery frame in the track), the inter-frame standard deviation per frequency line, the
variation in the inter-frame mean value between adjacent frequency lines, and the
variation in the inter-frame standard deviation between adjacent frequency lines.
Moreover, given that Vorbis works for 2 types of frames, short and long frames
(whose concrete length will depend on the codec’s configuration used), we have
studied each of the values stated before for each frame type. In the caption of each
graph in is shown what configuration correspond to the graph. The original signal
is referred as “carrier”, and for the modified signals, the convention used is as fol-
lows: <track><hiding><synchronization><aggressiveness>, where <track>
will be either 0 or 1 depending on whether the corresponding signal is track1 or
track2; <synchronization> will be 0 for classic synchronization and 1 for ISS
synchronization; <hiding> will be 0 for direct hiding and 1 for parity bit hidng;
and finally, <aggressiveness> will be 3, 6 or 9, depending on whether we have
used 30, 60 or 90 percent of the subliminal channel’s capacity. Therefore, e.g.,
1103 will refer to the track2, with parity bit hiding, ISS synchronization, and a
30% of subliminal channel’s usage.
The figure 7.1 is obtained from short frames in track1, using the classic synchro-
nization method. It shows, in the two upper graphs, the behavior of the inter-frame
mean values per frequency line, corresponding the graph at the left to the mean
values and the graph at the right to the variations between adjacent frequency lines.
The values associated to the carrier signal are shown in red. It can be seen that
these values have large variations for the lower frequencies, although these vari-
ations rapidly atenuate, staying in the range [0.1,0.1]. The lines corresponding
110 CHAPTER 7. RESULTS ANALYSIS
Figure 7.1: Variations in the residue for classic synchronization in short frames
and track1. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-
right graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent
frequency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
to aggressiveness of 30% in light-blue and green (they are almost superimposed),
follow an evolution similar to the carrier, although more abrupt; the lines associ-
ated to a 60% of channel usage, in brown and dark-blue (also almost completely
superimposed), are also much more abrupt; while the lines corresponding to a
90% usage, although suffering slightly lesser variations, are in a different range,
near 0.5.
As for the standard deviations, shown in the two lower graphs and with the same
colours correspondence we can see how they keep a similar behavior.
7.3. STATISTICAL IMPERCEPTIBILITY 111
Figure 7.2: Variations in the residue for classic synchronization in long frames
and track1. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-
right graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent
frequency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
In the figure 7.2, which depicts the same as figure 7.1 but for long frames and
track1, we can see the same behavior. Nevertheless, it is more noticeable given
that we have a greater frequency precission. Moreover, we can also see that the
methods with a higher aggressiveness are those that introduce larger variations in
the mean values. Besides, we can also note something that is not so clear in figure
7.1: for high frequencies, there is an increase in the variations in the standard
deviations of the stego-frames, while the variations for the mean values decrease.
This may probably be a direct effect of the adopted psychoacoustic principles,
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which give more freedom for high and low frequencies. We can also see that
in the graphs at the left (mean and standard deviation), the yellow signal (0109,
which is over 0009) is always maintained at the maximum variation, given that,
by construction, is the one introducing a larger variation.
Below we show the same analysis for track2. In all of them, the same color
correspondence is used.
Figure 7.3: Variations in the residue for classic synchronization in short frames
and track2. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-
right graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent
frequency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
In the figure 7.3 we show the variations introduced in the short frames of track2,
wich classic synchronization and both hiding methods. There, the carrier signal
7.3. STATISTICAL IMPERCEPTIBILITY 113
suffers very abrupt changes in the inter-frame mean values per frequency line.
This is probably due to a strong presence of pure tones in classical music, and,
also, to minor presence of noisy components. Here, the modifications introduced
in the carrier signal difer less in their behavior, given that the behavior of the signal
itself is very erratic. Nevertheless, although in this case the signals using a 30%
of the channel follow a similar evolution than the original signal, the signals with
using a 60% and 90% still introduce large variations. Specially the signal using a
90% of the channel, moves in an interval quite higher, near values of 0.5.
As for the evolution of the inter-frame standard deviations per frequency line,
the behavior is similar to the one obtained for track1, being very similar that of
the original signal.
The image 7.4 depicts the same results as above, but for long frames, using the
classic synchronization method and both hiding methods. Here we do not see the
increase in the variations between standard deviations at high frquencies. This
can be due to the lesser amount of noise in the original signal, what makes the
method to limit the allowed changes. It is worth noting that the methods with low
aggressiveness introduce, in this case, much less variation in middle values, again
probably because of a lesser noise presence in track2.
Now we will show the graphs associated to the ISS synchronization method, in
four distint images, each with four separate graphs representing the same statisti-
cal measures than before. In all of them we will keep the same color distribution:
the red color will correspond to the original signal, green to the 013 signal, dark-
blue to the 016, purple to the 019, light-blue to the 113, brown to the 116 and
yellow to the 119 signal. The first to images will correspond to track1, while the
two latter to track2.
In the image 7.5 we observe a different behavior to the one seen in image 7.1.
In this case, all the configurations behave in a very similar way, while for the
graphs in the image 7.1 the signals with low channel usage were slightly less
abrupt. Therefore, here, the inter-frame mean values and the differentials between
adjacent frequencies, follow an evolution much more abrupt than the evolution of
the original signal. Moreover, at high frequencies we can also observe a decrease
in the variations of the mean values, and an increase of the standard deviations.
Let’s see what happens with long frames.
Again, figure 7.6 shows the same behavior that we saw in figure 7.2. This allows
us check that the evolution of the statistical features of the residue vectors is sim-
ilar, independently of the synchronization method. And also even independently
of the hiding method, depending only on the percentage of usage of the subliminal
channel.
Now we will see the effects of hiding information using ISS synchornization
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Figure 7.4: Variations in the residue for classic synchronization in long frames
and track2. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-
right graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent
frequency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
and both hiding methods in the classical music audio track.
Here, in both figures, 7.7 and 7.8, the same behavior than in figures 7.5 and 7.6 is
repeated. The evolution can seem similar for low levels of usage of the subliminal
channel, although for long frames we can observe the same effects as before. That
is, a highly erratic behavior in the mean values, with a higher variation range as
the usage of the subliminal channel is increased. Also, similar standard deviations
are kept, including the high frequencies, as we observed in figures 7.3 and 7.4,
being the explanation a lesser noise presence in track2.
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Figure 7.5: Variations in the residue for ISS synchronization in short frames and
track1. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-right
graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent fre-
quency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
In short, we can observe in every case, but specially for the long frames, how
the mean values give away the hidden information, being it evident at the middle
frequencies. But for the standard deviations, it is in the high frequencies where
we can see the changes introduced by the hidden information. As we said before,
this is probably due to the psychoacoustic model applied, the ITU-R BS.468-4,
which allows larger modifications at high frequencies. This is translated by our
hiding method in larger channel usages at high frequencies, leading in turn to
larger standard deviations.
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Figure 7.6: Variations in the residue for ISS synchronization in long frames and
track1. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-right
graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent fre-
quency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
At last, we still have to see what effects does our method have in the floor
vector. Given that only the configurations using the ISS synchronization method
modify the floor vector, we will study just these in the following figures. The
color distribution will be the same for all the figures, being the red signal the one
corresponding the original audio, the green one being the 013 signal, the dark-blue
the signal 016, the purpble the 019, the light-blue the 113, the brown the 116 and
the yellow signal the 119. Again, the two first figures will correspond to track1,
while the two latter to track2.
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Figure 7.7: Variations in the residue for ISS synchronization in short frames and
track2. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-right
graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent fre-
quency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
We can see in figures 7.9 and 7.10 that the behavior of the floor vector, at least
concerning the mean and standard deviation values, is statistically similar to the
original floor vector. This is due to the very nature of the algorithm of Malvar and
Florencio, where the pseudo-random sequence used to mark the original vectors
has zero mean. In the images corresponding to the effect of ISS over track2 (7.11
and 7.12) we corroborate these results.
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Figure 7.8: Variations in the residue for ISS synchronization in long frames and
track2. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-right
graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent fre-
quency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
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Figure 7.9: Variations in the floor for ISS synchronization in short frames and
track1. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-right
graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent fre-
quency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
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Figure 7.10: Variations in the floor for ISS synchronization in long frames and
track1. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-right
graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent fre-
quency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
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Figure 7.11: Variations in the floor for ISS synchronization in short frames and
track2. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-right
graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent fre-
quency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
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Figure 7.12: Variations in the floor for ISS synchronization in long frames and
track2. The upper left graph shows the inter-frame mean vlaues; the upper-right
graph shows the variation of the inter-frame mean values between adjacent fre-
quency lines; the lower left graph shows the inter-frame standard deviation; and
the lower right graph shows the variations of the inter-frame standard deviations
between adjacent frequency lines.
Chapter 8
Results, conclusions and future work
As a result of this work we have obtained a basic knowledge of the theory and
processing of signals, with emphasis in acoustic ones. We have also studied the
main properties of the Human Auditory System, which have allowed us to find
“wholes” to develop a stego-system in, using the Vorbis audio codec.
As for steganography, our study allows to obtain a good general view, with
a medium depth level of the state of the arte, and composes a solid base from
which one can study more advanced methods. This work has also allowed us
to establish some guides from which we can now create and design a new stego-
system. The study of the basic steganalyitic techniques is a necessary step to know
the weaknesses of the steganographic methods, and this is a must-do in order to
develop efective algorithms, with the desired properties.
We have to say that it was never the purpose of this work to create an unbreak-
able system, but one which could be a starting point for the creation of a com-
petent one. Therefore, although as we say below, we can consider our method to
be statistically steganalyzed (something that is not usually easy to achieve), this
must not be considered just a flaw. It must be seen as a recognition of a weakness
of the algorithm, and a way showing our next steps in order to achieve a good
stego-system.
Analyzing the results in more detail, related to the capacity, we have seen in
section 7.1 that the method offers a relatively high capacity. Therefore, this re-
quirement for steganographic systems seems to have been accomplished. Never-
theless, in section 7.2 we can see by the means of ABX tests that the methods
using a high share of the subliminal channel are psychoacoustically perceptible.
That makes us advise not to use more than a 30% or a 40% of the subliminal chan-
nel’s capacity. Studying the entropy of the resulting bitstream, in subsection 7.3.1,
we gave the first blow to the system, by obvserving that the entropy is increased
by 0.5 bits per byte, or more. Finally, the biggest flaw is that of subsection 7.3.2,
where we analyzed the statistical imperceptibility. There we saw that the mean
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values of the residue vectors coefficients for the produced stego-signals present
higher variations than those of original signals. This allows us to identify stego-
objects produced with our system. This is due to the fact that, although we control
the variation in the residue coefficients, we do it independently from one coef-
ficient to antoher. Therefore, the relations between adjacent frequency lines are
profoundly affected, showing the erratic behavior seen in the previous chapter.
Nevertheless, the psychoacoustic model used, based in the weighting curve in-
troduced in the ITU-R BS.468-R ([21]), seems to be a good method, given that for
low usages of the subliminal channel, the modifications are highly imperceptible.
Moreover, as we said in section 5.1, it follows the guides established by Fridrich
and Goljan in [17]. Nonetheless, it is obvious that we have to refine the method,
to allow a higher use of the channel in an imperceptible way, as for high usages of
the subliminal channel, the changes are perceptible by the HAS.
Related to the innovative system of synchronization with the floor vector, we can
conclude that its results are highly satisfactory. This method offers an exploitation
of the subliminal channel of roughly a 5% higher. Moreover, at least using the
statistics, here studied, it does not leave any perceptible trail. Nevertheless, we
have to pinpoint an important matter to improve with this synchronization method.
This is that, for the calculation of the floor marked floor vector, and for the stego-
residues, we used the psychoacoustic model derived from the ITU-R BS.468-4
two times independently. First for the floor vector and later for the residue vectors,
which can lead to overly increased variations. This effect is somehow reduced
because after increasing (decreasing) the floor vector at a given frequency, the
corresponding residue coefficient will be autoadjusted by decreasing (increasing)
itself. Nevertheless, it will ve advisable to take some cross measure to avoid big
distortions due to this effect.
It is also left as future work to add a method to limit the changes introduced in
the global volume. This is a delicate matter, since the properties of the HAS make
the volume to be perceived in a subjective manner. Grosso modo, the volume
can be measured as the total energy of the acoustic signal, weighted by means of
some curve (for intance, we could use the curve in the ITU-R BS.1770-1, see [22],
devised to measure volume changes). Such a curve should limit the changes ac-
cording to the sensitivity of the HAS to the different frequencies. The fact of this
being a delicate matter is that, although the Parseval relation establishes that the
energy of a signal is the same in the frequency domain than in the time domain, as
Vorbis is based on a overlapped transform, this principle is not of straightforward
application. Therefore, to design a method guaranteeing the psychoacoustic prop-
erties of the original volume, it is essential to possess a high degree of knowledge
of the Vorbis codec.
As for the system’s functionality, the only task considered as pending is to ex-
tend to extend the usage of the stego-system to the Vorbis modes including lossy
125
coupling in the residue vectors (i.e., those with a quality modifier below 6).
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